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INTRODUCTION
As the key enforcement provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, Section 10(b)1 and the corresponding Rule 10b-52 are widely
considered to be the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) foremost
tools in policing insider trading.3 As a result of the authority granted by these
provisions, the SEC has relied heavily on Section 10(b) and its corresponding
rules when pursuing insider trading claims.4 While these provisions are
standard in prosecuting insider trading enforcement actions, the standard of
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2016). Section 10(b) provides:

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange –
...

(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or
any securities-based swap agreement[] any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.

2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2016). Rule 10b-5 provides:

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,

(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
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3. See generally MARC I. STEINBERG & WILLIAM WANG, INSIDER TRADING (3d ed. 2010)
(reviewing heightened SEC scrutiny of insider trading).
4. See Salman v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 420 (2016) (affirming conviction of tippee of
material nonpublic information under Section 10(b) adhering to its holding in Dirks); United
States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (holding that a conviction under Section 10(b) can
be upheld under a misappropriation theory); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 665 (1983) (finding
that a tippee was not in violation of Section 10(b) because he had no duty that would have
required him to disclose the information he used to trade); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222 (1980) (reversing conviction under Section 10(b) because alleged violator was not a
corporate insider and, under the charges set forth, did not have a duty to disclose prior to
trading); see also Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2016) (prohibiting transactions in
securities on the basis of material, nonpublic information in connection with a tender offer).
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(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,

(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
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culpability that the SEC must prove to successfully prosecute an insider
trading claim under these provisions is quite demanding.5 In view of several
losses in recent insider trading enforcement actions,6 the SEC, when
appropriate, should consider bringing these actions under a different statute
than Section 10(b) — one that requires proof of a lesser standard of
culpability.
In order to successfully establish a claim under Section 10(b) (as well
as Rule 14e-3),7 the plaintiff must prove (among other elements) that the

04/17/2017 09:23:23
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5. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976) (concluding that
“manipulative,” “device,” and “contrivance” in § 10(b) “connote[] intentional or willful
conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors”); see also Dirks, 463 U.S. at 666 n.27
(“[T]o constitute a violation of Rule 10b–5, there must be fraud”); Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 234–
35 (“Section 10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it catches must be
fraud.”).
6. See, e.g., SEC v. Bauer, 723 F.3d 758 (7th Cir. 2013) (reversing a grant of summary
judgment for the SEC because a material issue of fact existed as to whether the materiality
and scienter requirements were met); SEC v. Moshayedi, Civil Action No. 12-cv-01179 (C.D.
Cal. Jun. 6, 2014) (finding for defendant on all claims made by the SEC); SEC v. Yang, Case
No. 12-cv-02473 (N.D. Ill. May 27, 2014) (finding in favor of defendants on insider trading
claims); SEC v. Steffes, Case No. 1:10-cv-06266 (N.D. Ill. Jan 27, 2014) (finding defendants
not guilty of insider trading when the SEC’s evidence was merely inferential); SEC v.
Schvacho, Civil Action No. 1:12-cv-0022557 (N.D. Ga. Jan 7, 2014) (finding that there was
not enough evidence to prove that Schvacho misappropriated insider information and that he
had obtained material, nonpublic information when overhearing telephone calls); SEC v.
Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2009), vacated and remanded, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir.
2010) (finding for defendant on insider trading claims); John Carreyrou, Mark Cuban Cleared
in
Insider-Trading
Case,
WALL
S T.
J.
(Oct.
26,
2013)
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303680404579139774081561730
[https://perma.cc/KAW9-XS9H]; see also United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir.
2014) (reversing and vacating criminal conviction based on unlawful tipping and trading).
7. Under the enabling provision of Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act, the SEC adopted
Rule 14e-3 in order to establish the “disclose or abstain from trading rule” in regard to tender
offers. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17120, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 82,646 (Sept. 4, 1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this limited context,
the proscriptions against trading and tipping on material confidential information are far more
onerous than under Section 10(b): Rule 14e-3 applies this disclose-or-abstain provision when
a defendant possesses material and nonpublic information that relates to a tender offer where
the person knows or has reason to know the information is nonpublic and was received
directly or indirectly from the offeror, the subject corporation, any of their affiliated persons,
or any person acting on behalf of either company. Rule 14e-3(a), (d), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e3(a), (d). Moreover, the rule contains a broad anti-tipping provision. Under Rule 14e-3, a
person who knows or has reason to know “that she is in possession of material nonpublic
information regarding a tender offer directly or indirectly from the” offeror (bidder), target
corporation, or an intermediary can neither trade nor tip the securities of the respective
company prior to adequate public disclosure (and absorption) of such information into the
public securities markets. Id. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 645 (upholding Rule 14e-3 as a
“proper exercise of the SEC’s prophylactic power under §14(e)” and finding that these
provisions applied to O’Hagan in addition to Section 10(b) charges). In addition, a tippee of
material and nonpublic information related to a tender offer who knows, or has reason to

39057-ple_19-2 reissue Sheet No. 4 Side B

04/17/2017 09:23:23

1_STEINBERG RAMIREZ_ CLEAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

242

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

4/15/17 5:06 PM

[Vol.19:2

defendant acted with “scienter”8 as the requisite mens rea.9 In the context of
insider trading, this means that, in order for liability to attach, the SEC must
establish that an insider was aware of material and nonpublic information at
the time that the insider traded.10 Further, one who knowingly conveys such
information to others in breach of one’s fiduciary duty is also deemed to have
the requisite scienter.11
Currently, a void exists in the spectrum of liability for insider trading
causes of action. In other words, when the SEC pursues a cause of action
against a defendant purchaser under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for an
insider trading violation, there are only two possible outcomes – liability for
intentional insider trading (i.e., a court holds that the defendant committed
insider trading by acting with scienter), or a complete lack of liability (i.e., a
court rules that the defendant did not commit intentional insider trading). In
contrast to various offenses that typically maintain varying levels of liability

04/17/2017 09:23:23
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know, that the subject information has come directly or indirectly from an offeror, target
corporation, or intermediary similarly cannot trade or tip on the stock of the respective
company prior to adequate public disclosure (and absorption) of this information into the
public securities markets. § 240.14e-3(a), (d). Because of the narrow scope of Rule 14e-3,
as applying only in the tender offer context, insider trading proceedings have been primarily
pursued under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226 (“Section 10(b)
was designed as a catch-all clause to prevent fraudulent practices.”); see also Rule 10b5-2, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2016) (defining the situations in which the misappropriation theory
applies to charges under Rule 10b-5); see generally A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, Securities
Fraud & Commodities Fraud (2012) (surveying the extensive, diverse use of Rule 10b-5).
“Rule 10b5-2 clarifies how the misappropriation theory applies to certain non-business
relationships. This rule provides that a person receiving confidential information under
circumstances specified in the rule would owe a duty of trust or confidence and thus could be
liable under the misappropriation theory.” SEC, Fast Answers: Insider Trading (Jan. 15,
2013), http://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm [https://perma.cc/7P4L-CBFD]; STEINBERG
& WANG, supra note 3, at § 5.4.3.
8. Scienter is defined as “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud.” Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 686 n.5 (1980) (quoting Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at
193 n.12).
9. See, e.g., id. at 680.
10. See generally Rule 10b5-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2016) (“Rule 10b5-1 provides
that a person trades on the basis of material nonpublic information if a trader is ‘aware’ of the
material nonpublic information when making the purchase or sale.”). Fast Answers: Insider
Trading, supra note 7; STEINBERG & WANG, supra note 3, at § 4.4.5.
11. See Salman, 137 S.Ct. 420 (applying rationale of Dirks); Dirks, 463 U.S. 646
(holding that the duty of tippees to disclose or abstain from trading depends on whether the
tipper has herself breached a fiduciary duty); U.S. v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d. Cir. 1981)
(upholding an indictment on the grounds that the defendants had allegedly misappropriated
material and nonpublic information entrusted to them by their employers and clients);
Newman, 773 F.3d at 446 (“The elements of tipping liability are the same, regardless of
whether the tipper’s duty arises under the ‘classical’ or the ‘misappropriation’ theory.”)
(internal citations omitted); see also Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222 (reversing conviction of
Chiarella because he did not have a duty to disclose).
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enumerated by statute, the only potential outcomes for insider trading
liability in the purchaser context are on opposite sides of the liability
spectrum, thus creating a gap that allows “grey-area” inside traders to avoid
liability.12 Therefore, when pursuing insider trading against purchasers
under Section 10(b), the SEC faces the challenging requirement of proving
the defendant’s intentional or knowing misconduct.13
The SEC’s task of proving liability would be significantly lessened (and
presumably more successful) if it could pursue insider trading claims that
require proof of a lesser mental state, namely, that of negligence. Indeed,
there is such a provision that grants the SEC with this power: Section
17(a)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933.14 Unlike claims of insider trading
brought under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, which require the SEC to prove
scienter,15 insider trading may be pursued by the Commission under Section
17(a)(3) based upon negligence.16 To date, the SEC occasionally has
invoked this provision against negligent sellers who allegedly have engaged
in illegal insider trading.17
Although Section 17(a) is not an unheard of statute to invoke in insider
trading proceedings (as well as with respect to other alleged misconduct
involving securities18), it has been primarily used as a supplement to, and in
12. See supra note 6.
13. “The words ‘manipulative or deceptive’ used in conjunction with ‘device or
contrivance’ strongly suggest that § 10(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or intentional
misconduct.” Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 197.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3)(2016). Section 17(a)(3) provides:

(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
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15. See Aaron, 446 U.S. at 691 (“Rule 10b–5 must . . . be restricted to conduct involving
scienter.”).
16. See id. at 697 (noting that § 17(a)(3) “focuses upon the effect of particular conduct
on members of the investing public, rather than upon the culpability of the person
responsible”). In criminal cases (even for Section 17(a)(3)), intent must be shown. See 15
U.S.C. § 78ff (punishing knowing and willful conduct).
17. See, e.g., Bolan, Exchange Act Release No. 75066, 2015 SEC LEXIS 2201 (May 28,
2015) at n.2. (“Scienter is not required to prove a violation of Section 17(a)(3). Instead, a
violation of this section may be established by showing negligent conduct.”) (internal citations
omitted).
18. See SEC v. Lyon, 529 F.Supp.2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that SEC sufficiently
pled claim that investors violated Section 17(a) of the Securities Act by purchasing private
investments in public equities (PIPE) securities, then taking short sale positions in PIPE
issuers’ publicly traded stock, where SEC alleged that investors agreed to be bound by
confidentiality clauses contained in documents they received in connection with PIPE
offerings).
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It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities . . . by the
use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or by use of the mails, directly or indirectly
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conjunction with, Rule 10b-5 as an additional cause of action to prosecute
“scheme” liability.19 For the most part, these enforcement actions invoked
Section 17(a)(1) which, like Rule 10b-5, requires that scienter be proven.20
Thus, a specific definition of negligence in the context of insider trading has
received scant attention.21
Section 17(a)(3) has been widely neglected as a weapon in the SEC’s
arsenal against insider trading. Section 17(a)(3) carries the potential of
providing the SEC with an advantage that is not afforded by Section 10(b),
Rule 10b-5, or Rule 14e-3 — the authority to prosecute insider trading claims
premised on the lesser mental state of negligence (namely, that a defendant
should have known that her acts would be used to perpetrate an insider
trading violation, a substantially lighter burden than the scienter requirement
of Rule 10b-5). Thus, Section 17(a)(3) would cast a wider net to enforce
insider trading regulations against a new category of defendants: negligent
inside traders as well as negligent tippers and tippees.22 However, despite
the power granted under Section 17(a)(3) to pursue negligent insider trading
claims, the elements of such a cause of action have yet to be sufficiently
formulated. Further, the current language of Section 17(a)(3) limits the
power of such a cause of action to only negligent (or more culpable) inside
traders that offer or sell23 securities in a transaction that ultimately results in
a fraud “upon the purchaser,”24 thereby ensnaring a substantially smaller

04/17/2017 09:23:23
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19. See Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 190 (7th Cir. 1978) (“The SEC has also used
its full panoply of powers to police insider trading through enforcement actions and civil
actions. The agency has relied . . . on Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act. . .”); SEC v. Kirch, 263
F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1149 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (“It has long been established that ‘insider trading’ in
the literal and classic sense—trading in a corporation’s stock by a corporate insider on the
basis of material nonpublic information—violates Securities Act § 17(a) . . .”); see also, U.S.
v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979) (involving a fraudulent short sale of securities under
§ 17(a)(1)); Marc I. Steinberg, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act After Naftalin and
Redington, 68 GEO L.J. 163 (1979) (discussing the use of Section 17(a) to prosecute schemes
instead of Section 10(b)).
20. See Aaron, 446 U.S. at 697 (holding that Section 17(a)(3) “quite plainly focuses upon
the effect of particular conduct on members of the investing public, rather than upon the
culpability of the person responsible”).
21. See generally U.S. v. Evans, 486 F.3d 315 (7th Cir. 2007) (suggesting, in dicta, that
tippee liability can exist where the tip is merely a “careless” passing on of information:
“Unlike Dirks, Gianamore was not a whistleblower. Instead, he was an insider acting either
carelessly or negligently by giving his friend material insider information that the friend then
traded on.”).
22. See Aaron, 446 U.S. at 697 (“[T]he language of § 17(a) requires scienter under
§ 17(a)(1), but not under § 17(a)(2) or § 17(a)(3).”).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3); see also Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (holding that Section 17(a)
applies to frauds against brokers and investors).
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25. The typical scenario in which an inside trader sells securities is when the insider
attempts to avoid losses on securities that are already owned. When the inside trader is aware
of material and nonpublic information at the time of the trade, a fraud has resulted “upon the
purchaser” (Section 17(a)(3)). However, the most common insider trading causes of action
regard the inside trader who purchases securities in an attempt to profit based on material and
nonpublic information. Thus, the fraud that results is upon the seller.
26. See DAVID A. VISE & STEVE COLL, EAGLE ON THE STREET (1991) (providing a
historical account of the SEC’s “war” on insider trading); see also STEINBERG & WANG, supra
note 3, at § 7.3; Peter J. Henning, S.E.C.’s Losing Streak in Court Puts Agency in Spotlight,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2014) (discussing the SEC’s current losing streak and the difficulties in
its attempts at enforcing insider trading).

39057-ple_19-2 reissue Sheet No. 6 Side A

segment of insider trading defendants.25
A literal interpretation of Section 17(a)(3)’s language limits the
government’s ability to bring a claim of insider trading under this statute to
one scenario – the one in which a defendant offers or sells securities to a
purchaser who is unaware that the seller/defendant is privy to material,
nonpublic information that would typically be considered “bad news” (e.g.,
a subject company’s losses that have yet to be publicly announced).
Therefore, based on the statute’s language, requiring an act which operates
as a fraud “upon the purchaser,” Section 17(a)(3) does not provide authority
to the government to bring a claim of insider trading where the subject
defendant is “the purchaser” (namely, the scenario in which the insider
purchases her company’s stock while being privy to material, nonpublic
information that would typically be considered “good news” such as
impressive profits that have yet to be publicly announced). As a result of
this limitation in the text of the statute, the SEC is granted authority to
prosecute only a fraction of negligent insider trading violations – those in
which the defendant was the alleged seller (or offeror to sell).
Why does there exist an inequality of potential defendants that are
susceptible to causes of action for negligent insider trading under the
language of Section 17(a)(3)? With such a potentially powerful weapon at
its disposal, the SEC would be significantly more empowered if it were
granted the authority to prosecute a full spectrum of insider trading
violations, including those that currently reside in the void between “no
violation” and “intentional violation” (when pursued under Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5). In the SEC’s continuing “war” on insider trading,26 a
broader application of Section 17(a)(3) to include purchasers in addition to
sellers, as well as including a concise definition of negligent insider trading,
would enable the SEC to more vigilantly combat insider trading.
The objective of this article is to propose a method that will allow
regulators to bridge the gap that currently exists in the context of insider
trading liability. In order to accomplish this task, this article will: 1) discuss
the potential untapped resource of Section 17(a)(3) with respect to SEC
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enforcement of insider trading abuse; 2) discuss the theoretical concept of
negligent insider trading; and 3) suggest a solution to remedy this disparate
treatment – a legislative amendment to Section 17(a)(3) that would broaden
the scope of this statute to apply to both sellers and purchasers.
This article also suggests an interpretation of the proposed statute that
would enable the SEC to pursue negligent misconduct in the context of
insider trading committed by those who improperly use material and
nonpublic information (without having to establish the Rule 10b-5 scienter
element). Further, the word “indirectly,” as it is used in the introductory
paragraph of Section 17(a), may be construed to alter the scope and
application of the statute by broadening the range of misconduct that would
be subject to prosecution under this provision. If interpreted as developed
herein, the effect of this term would allow the SEC to pursue insider trading
violations based on negligence against those who improperly use material
and nonpublic information or who misappropriate such information.
In order to address the rationale behind the proposed legislative
amendment, and thereby focus on the amended Section 17(a)(3) as a
potential weapon in the SEC’s arsenal, it is necessary to discuss the history
and evolution of judicial interpretation of the specific language within the
current statute. Thereafter, a proposed interpretation of the statute’s yet-tobe-amended language as applied in the context of insider trading will be
provided. Finally, the article will discuss several insider trading cases, in
which the SEC incurred losses under Rule 10b-5, but may have tasted victory
under the yet-to-be amended Section 17(a)(3).
I.

OVERVIEW OF INSIDER TRADING

C M
Y K

04/17/2017 09:23:23

27. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230; O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652; Dirks, 463 U.S. at 647.
28. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226-30.
29. Early case law, in which the SEC pursued claims of insider trading under Section
10(b), was primarily focused on the most basic of insider trading situations – direct sales or
purchases, by a defendant company’s directors or its officers, of securities issued by that same
company, where the defendant willfully failed to disclose material nonpublic information
about the company’s affairs, when such information affected the value of those securities.
See, e.g., In re Ward La France Truck Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 3445 (Jun. 10, 1943);

39057-ple_19-2 reissue Sheet No. 6 Side B

Based on Supreme Court precedent, insider trading is defined as
purchasing or selling a security, in breach of a fiduciary duty or similar
relationship of trust and confidence, while aware of material, nonpublic
information regarding the subject corporation or the market for its
securities.27 The unlawfulness of insider trading is premised on the notion
that insider trading is a type of securities fraud28 based on the inherent
unfairness that results when fiduciaries and other specific persons,29 who are
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aware of material and nonpublic information, reap profits or avoid losses to
the detriment of investors who trade securities without being privy to such
information.30 Insider trading involves a transaction in which someone
“deceives” by omission when there exists a duty to disclose.31 The
“omission” in an insider trading transaction occurs when a party engages in
a securities transaction while being aware of material and nonpublic
information (e.g., information that would likely impact the price of the
security and result in either a profit or an avoidance of loss), and that party
fails to adequately disclose such information.32 This breach of duty to
Speed v. Transamerica, 99 F.Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951). Subsequent case law has
expanded the scope of Section 10(b)’s application to claims of insider trading while
simultaneously refining the legal theories upon which a claim for insider trading may be
premised.
Although the elements of an insider trading violation under Section 10(b) are not
legislatively enumerated, three Supreme Court rulings have established definitive elements:
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) and
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). Essentially, proscribed insider trading occurs
under Section 10(b) when a defendant: (1) is aware of material and nonpublic information
regarding a company or its securities, and (2) is bound by a fiduciary duty (or similar
relationship of trust or confidence), (3) to either that company’s shareholders or to the source
of the information, and (4) purchases or sells (or engages in tipping of) the company’s
securities prior to that information being disseminated and absorbed by the investing public.
The Supreme Court’s most recent decision, United States v. Salman, 137 S.Ct. 420 (2016),
adheres to its holding in Dirks.
30.
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Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 249 (quoting Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) (footnote
omitted)).
31. An omission is misleading if it creates “an impression of a state of facts that differs
in a material way from the one that actually exists.” Brody v. Transitional Hosps. Corp., 280
F.3d 997, 1006 (9th Cir. 2002); see also New Jersey Carpenters Health Fund v. Royal Bank
of Scotland Group, PLC, 709 F.3d 109, 126 (2d. Cir. 2013) (finding “[a] reasonable investor
can independently analyze how a security will perform in the market, but she cannot
compensate for the fact that she has not received what she was told to expect”); Dodona I,
LLC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 847 F. Supp. 2d 624, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding
“[u]ltimately, an incomplete or misleading disclosure may be just as damaging as total
concealment”); Schlifke v. Seafirst Corp., 866 F.2d 935, 944 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that
“incomplete disclosures, or ‘half-truths,’ implicate a duty to disclose whatever additional
information is necessary to rectify the misleading statements”).
32. Materiality is determined based upon whether there is a “substantial likelihood that
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as
having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.” Basic, Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S.
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[T]he Commission defined the category of ‘insiders’ subject to a disclose-orabstain obligation according to two factors: “[F]irst, the existence of a
relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose, and not for the personal benefit of anyone,
and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of
such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.”

39057-ple_19-2 reissue Sheet No. 7 Side B

04/17/2017 09:23:23

1_STEINBERG RAMIREZ_ CLEAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

248

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

4/15/17 5:06 PM

[Vol.19:2

disclose has resulted in two principal bases of Section 10(b) liability: the
classical “special relationship” theory and the misappropriation theory.33
A. The Classical “Special Relationship” Theory
The classical “special relationship” theory of insider trading “holds that
a corporate insider (such as an officer or director) violates Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 by trading on the corporation’s securities on the basis of material,
nonpublic information about the corporation.”34 Under the classical “special
relationship” theory of insider trading under Section 10(b), a fiduciary duty
exists between a company’s shareholders and corporate insiders (e.g.,
directors and officers).35 This fiduciary duty gives rise “to a duty to disclose
or abstain from trading because of the necessity of preventing a corporate
insider from taking advantage of uninformed stockholders.”36 Thus, the
fraudulent act in a classical “special relationship” insider trading transaction
is premised on a fraudulent omission by a corporate insider when she sells
her subject company’s stock to (or purchases from) her subject company’s
shareholders in breach of the duty owed. The Supreme Court has embraced
the classical “special relationship” theory under Rule 10b-5.37 Under this
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438, 449 (1976)). Information is material if “there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
purchaser or seller of a security (1) would consider the fact important in deciding whether to
buy or sell the security or (2) a substantial likelihood existed that a reasonable investor would
have viewed the total mix of information made available to be significantly altered by
disclosure of the fact.” Longman v. Food Lion, Inc., 197 F.3d 675, 683 (4th Cir. 1999); see
also Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2011) (finding that in order
to satisfy the materiality requirement, there must be “a substantial likelihood that the
disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available”); Dunn v. Borta, 369 F.3d
421, 427 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that the reasonable investor standard requires “a showing
of a substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have
assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable [investor]”); SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969) (holding that “[b]efore insiders may act upon material information, such information
must have been effectively disclosed in a manner sufficient to insure its availability to the
investing public”).
33. SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551, 554-55 (5th Cir. 2010); SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403,
408-09 (7th Cir. 1991); STEINBERG & WANG, supra note 3, at §§ 5.2-5.4.
34. Newman, 773 F.3d at 445.
35. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654.
36. Newman, 773 F.3d at 446 (finding “[t]he elements of tipping liability are the same,
regardless of whether the tipper’s duty arises under the ‘classical’ or the ‘misappropriation’
theory”) (internal citations omitted).
37. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222. In regard to insider status, the Supreme Court’s decision
in Dirks, despite its restrictive holding, adopted the principle of the “quasi-insider.” This
approach focuses on those persons who may constructively be considered an “insider” with a
fiduciary duty to disclose material nonpublic information or abstain from trading. The Court
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theory, the counterparty to the transaction is the victim of the deception
because, by engaging in this transaction, the counterparty has been deceived
into believing that the insider does not have information “known to [her] by
virtue of [her] position” that, if known to the shareholder, “would affect [his]
investment judgment.”38
Hence, a fundamental principle, recognized at least since the SEC’s
decision in In re Cady, Roberts & Co over fifty years ago, is that an “insider”
and, in certain circumstances, the insider’s “tippee” must either: (1) disclose
the material and nonpublic information that is in his possession prior to
trading; or (2) abstain from trading altogether.39 The holding in Cady (in
which the SEC alleged liability under Section 17(a) along with Section
10(b)), and later refined in Chiarella, established the classical “special
relationship” theory of insider trading.40 Generally, the classical theory
focuses on trading by corporate fiduciaries in the securities of their own
corporations.41 Under this approach, a person violates Rule 10b-5 when he
is an insider of a corporation, and, in breach of his fiduciary duty owed to
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expounded this principle by stating:
Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is revealed
legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant working for the
corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the shareholders. The basis for
recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that such persons acquired nonpublic
corporate information, but rather that they have entered into a special confidential
relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given access to
information solely for corporate purposes. . . . [W]hen such a person breaches his
fiduciary relationship, he may be treated more properly as a tipper than a tippee. . . . For
such a duty to be imposed, however, the corporation must expect the outsider to keep the
disclosed nonpublic information confidential, and the relationship at least must imply
such a duty.
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 677 n.14 (internal citations omitted). Hence, the Court declined to confine
the classical insider trading proscription to directors and officers of the company. Rather,
under the Court’s rationale, “individuals enjoying a special relationship with the corporation,
such as accountants, attorneys, consultants, and underwriters, may be viewed as insiders when
they trade on material nonpublic information that they legitimately received during the course
of that relationship.” MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAWS 387-88 (6th ed.
2014).
38. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227; see also STEINBERG, supra note 37.
39. 40 SEC at 911.
40. 445 U.S. at 227.
41. See Dirks, 463 U.S. 646 (concerning an officer of a broker-dealer specializing in
providing investment analysis of insurance company securities to institutional investors who
was charged with aiding and abetting violations of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule
10b-5 for providing material nonpublic information about an insurance company to clients
and investors, who relied on such information in selling their holdings thereof); see also SEC
v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 631 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Cherif, 933 F.2d at 408) (“Under the
classical theory, a person violates [Rule 10b-5] when he or she buys or sells securities on the
basis of material, non-public information and at the same time is an insider of the corporation
whose securities are traded.”).
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the corporation and its shareholders, buys or sells securities of that
corporation while being aware of material and nonpublic information.42 In
other words, the classical “special relationship” theory only imposes liability
when an inside trader is a corporate insider (e.g., director, control person, or
officer) or a temporary insider of the company (e.g., investment banker or
legal counsel) whose securities the insider has traded. Under this theory,
such an inside trader breaches a fiduciary duty owed to the company’s
shareholders. Thus, in Chiarella v. United States, the Supreme Court
reasoned that liability for trading based on material nonpublic information
arises under Section 10(b) if there exists a “duty to disclose arising from a
relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction.”43
1. Insider is the Purchaser (“Good News” Scenario)

2. Insider is the Seller (“Bad News” Scenario)
When an insider commits an insider trading offense by selling stock,
the typical scenario that occurs under the classical “special relationship”
theory of insider trading is the “bad news” scenario — the insider becomes
aware of material and non-public information that is expected to cause the
price of the stock to decrease in value (i.e., bearish information) and sells
securities in order to avoid a loss from the decrease in the securities’ value.
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42. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227-28; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1, supra note 10.
43. Chiarella, 445 U.S at 230; see also id. at 235 (rejecting the equal access rationale
and holding that “[A] duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession
of nonpublic market information”).
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When an insider commits an insider trading offense by purchasing
stock, the typical scenario that occurs under the classical “special
relationship” theory of insider trading is the “good news” scenario – the
insider becomes aware of material and nonpublic information that is
expected to cause the price of the stock to increase in value (i.e., bullish
information) and then purchases securities with the intent of profiting from
the increase in the securities’ value. Information that is typically “good
news” includes higher profits, launch of a new product, receipt of a lucrative
contract, or a profitable acquisition or disposition. As the more recognized,
and more commonly prosecuted scenario of insider trading violations, Rule
10b-5 is invoked when the corporate insider purchases a subject company’s
securities without disclosing the favorable inside information about the
company’s affairs to the investing public as well as to the party selling the
subject securities.
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Information that is typically “bad news” includes lower profits, increased
debt, loss of a major contract, or a government enforcement action.44 As the

C M
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Section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 are violated when a corporate insider trades in the
securities of his corporation on the basis of material, nonpublic information.
Trading on such information qualifies as a ‘deceptive device’ under § 10(b) . . .
because a relationship of trust and confidence [exists] between the shareholders
of a corporation and those insiders who have obtained confidential information
by reason of their position with that corporation. The ambit of Rule 10b–5’s
prohibition on insider trading extends beyond the insiders who themselves have
a fiduciary duty but also to the ‘tippee’ recipients of insider information from
those who are insiders. An individual is liable as a tippee under Rule 10b–5 if:
(1) the tippee received material nonpublic information regarding a publicly traded
company from a tipper; (2) the tippee traded securities while in possession of the
information; (3) the tippee knew that the tipper had violated a fiduciary duty when
the information was provided; and (4) the tippee benefitted from the disclosure
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44. Two relatively recent insider trading cases that involve both buys (“Good News”
Scenario) and sales (“Bad News” Scenario) are the cases involving the hedge fund, Galleon
Management. The civil case, SEC v. Galleon Mgmt., LP (683 F. Supp. 2d 316 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
9, 2010)), and the corresponding criminal case against Galleon founder, Raj Rajaratnam, U.S.
v. Rajaratnam, (802 F.Supp.2d 491 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2011)), involved an insider trading
scheme estimated to have generated approximately $45 million in both profits and savings.
Among several other various stocks traded (both long and short), Rajaratnam was convicted
of insider trading for short selling the stock of the microprocessor manufacturing company,
Intel, based on material and nonpublic information.
In both cases, Rajaratnam, was found to have received material nonpublic
information from his personal friend, Rajiv Goel. Goel was a managing director with Intel’s
treasury group – Intel Capital, which made proprietary equity investments in various
technology companies. In one particular instance, Goel spoke to Rajaratnam and told him to
short sell Intel stock because, based on Goel’s personal knowledge of the company’s financial
status, he was aware that Intel’s earnings would be below expectations. In return, Goel asked
that Rajaratnam place similar trades in Goel’s personal brokerage account (to which
Rajaratnam was an authorized manager) in order to falsely suggest that the trades in the
account were not placed directly by Goel (which would have been a violation of Goel’s
fiduciary duty owed to Intel).
On April 9, 2007, one week before Intel’s scheduled Ql 2007 earnings
announcement, Rajaratnam and Galleon sold short 1,000,000 shares of Intel stock at $20.14
per share. Rajaratnam also fulfilled the requested trades in Goel’s personal brokerage
account. When Intel ultimately released its Q1 2007 earnings, Rajaratnam and Galleon
profited from the trades in the amount of $1.3 million, and avoided losses in the amount of
$917,000.
The court found the subject of the confidential information discussed between
Rajaratnam and Goel to be “material.” Rajaratnam, 802 F.Supp.2d 491. The court also found
that Goel, a corporate insider based on his employment position with Intel, had violated his
fiduciary duty to his employer by communicating the information to Rajaratnam. Id. As a
result, both Rajaratnam and Goel were held to have violated Rule 10b-5’s prohibition of
trading based on material nonpublic information. Id.
While possessing or even sometimes trading based on material nonpublic
information is not necessarily a violation of the law, the court described how Rule 10b-5 was
violated in this instance by both: (1) the trader and (2) the tipper.
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less recognized, and less commonly prosecuted scenario of insider trading
violations, Rule 10b-5 is invoked when the corporate insider sells a subject
company’s securities without disclosing the unfavorable inside information
about the company’s affairs to the investing public as well as to the party
purchasing the subject securities.45 Under the language of Section 17(a)(3),
liability for negligent insider trading is limited to only this less-common
scenario.46
B. The Misappropriation Theory
An alternative theory of insider trading liability under Section 10(b) is
the “misappropriation theory,” which extends liability to certain “outsiders”
who do not have a fiduciary relationship to the subject company or its
shareholders.47 Liability under the misappropriation theory attaches where
such an “outsider” (such as an attorney or investment banker) obtains
material and nonpublic information about the company and subsequently
breaches a fiduciary duty to the source of that information by using the
information for personal gain — either directly, by trading based on the
information, or indirectly, by passing the information on to others.48 In other
words, such conduct rises to the level of fraudulent insider trading because
the misappropriator’s conduct is deceptive by feigning “loyalty to the
of the information.

Id., at 497-98 (internal quotations removed).
45. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5.
46. Section 17(a) provides:

(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or

(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading; or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
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15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (emphasis added).
47. Newman, 773 F.3d at 445-46.
48. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652 (“The ‘misappropriation theory’ holds that a person
commits fraud ‘in connection with’ a securities transaction, and thereby violates § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, when he misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes,
in breach of a duty owed to the source of information.”); see also Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664
(explaining that a fraud may also be committed when the person possessing the confidential
information does not, herself, trade based on the information, but rather provides the
information as a gift to “a trading relative or friend”).
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It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities . . . by the
use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or by use of the mails, directly or indirectly—
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49. SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 285 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653).
50. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231-35.
51. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652-53 (“[T]he misappropriation theory outlaws trading
on the basis of nonpublic information by a corporate ‘outsider’ in breach of a duty owed not
to a trading party, but to the source of the information.”); STEINBERG & WANG, supra note 3,
at § 5.4.
52. Joel Seligman, A Mature Synthesis: O’Hagan Resolves “Insider” Trading’s Most
Vexing Problems, 23 DEL J. CORP L. 1, 19-20 (1998) (quoting O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652).
53. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652; United States v. Gansman, 657 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 2011);
SEC v. Talbot, 530 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2006); SEC v. Rocklage 470 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.
2006).
54. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
55. Id. at 647. Unfortunately, attorneys allegedly have engaged in unlawful insider
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principal while secretly converting the principal’s information for personal
gain.”49
In contrast to the classical “special relationship” theory, the
misappropriation theory extends liability to a trader who is not a corporate
insider (as under the classical “special relationship” theory). When an inside
trader does not owe a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the company
whose stock is traded and he/she has not obtained the information from one
who has breached such a duty, there can be no insider trading liability under
the classical “special relationship” theory.50
However, in such
circumstances, liability may still be premised on the “misappropriation”
theory of insider trading. Under this theory, liability is based on deception
of the source of the information, rather than on deception of the shareholders
(as with the classical “special relationship” theory).51
Under the misappropriation theory of insider trading liability, the inside
trader does not owe a duty to disclose to the counterparty of the insider
trading transaction but, rather, to the source of the information. Rather than
premising liability on the direct fiduciary relationship between a company’s
shareholders and typical insiders (as would occur under the classical “special
relationship theory”), the misappropriation theory premises liability “on a
fiduciary-turned-trader’s deception of those who entrusted him with access
to confidential information.”52
In other words, the inside trader’s
improperly-motivated, undisclosed, and self-serving use of a subject
company’s material inside information, in breach of a duty of loyalty and
confidentiality to the source of the information, constitutes deceptive
conduct under Section 10(b) when it is used to purchase or sell securities.53
The Supreme Court gave its approbation to the misappropriation theory
in United States v. O’Hagan.54 In this case, the defendant, James O’Hagan,
was a partner of a national law firm that represented the bidding company,
Grand Metropolitan PLC, in a contemplated tender offer of Pillsbury
Company common stock.55 O’Hagan was not personally involved in the
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representation; however, he learned about the proposed deal and purchased
shares and options of the target company before the deal was made public
with the expectation that the value of the shares would increase once the
information about the deal was made public.56 Because O’Hagan’s law firm
represented the bidding company, he did not owe a fiduciary duty to the
target company’s stockholders and therefore could not be prosecuted under
the classical theory of insider trading.57 Nevertheless, the Court held that
O’Hagan was liable under the misappropriation theory because he had
deceived both his law firm and its client by feigning loyalty to them while
secretly converting information obtained from them into personal gain.58 As
a result, the Supreme Court held that a trader commits fraud in connection
with a securities transaction, and thereby violates Section 10(b), when the
trader misappropriates material and nonpublic information for the purpose
of engaging in a securities transaction, in breach of a duty owed to the source
of the information.59
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trading with some frequency. See, e.g., United States v. Elliott, 711 F. Supp. 425 (N.D. Ill.
March 31, 1989) (denying motion to dismiss charge against former law firm partner for
misusing confidential client information); Santarlas, Exchange Act Release No. 62,460,
[2010 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 89,060 (Jul. 7, 2010) (settlement)
(suspending an attorney from practice because he entered into a scheme to trade on non-public
information); U.S. v. Grossman, 843 F.2d 78, 79 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to dismiss an indictment of an attorney on securities
fraud charges for insider trading); see also MARC I. STEINBERG, ATTORNEY LIABILITY AFTER
SARBANES-OXLEY § 11.02 (2016) (discussing attorney liability for insider trading).
56. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647–48. See also id. at 653 n. 5 (“The Government could not
have prosecuted O’Hagan under the classical theory, for O’Hagan was not an ‘insider’ of
Pillsbury, the corporation in whose stock he traded. Although an ‘outsider’ with respect to
Pillsbury, O’Hagan had an intimate association with, and was found to have traded on
confidential information from, Dorsey & Whitney, counsel to tender offeror Grand Met.
Under the misappropriation theory, O’Hagan’s securities trading does not escape Exchange
Act sanction, as it would under [the dissent’s reasoning], simply because he was associated
with, and gained nonpublic information from, the bidder, rather than the target.”).
57. Id. at 653 n. 5; see also Newman, 773 F.3d at 445-46 (citing Obus, 693 F.3d at 285)
(“Liability may attach where an ‘outsider’ possesses material non-public information about a
corporation and another person uses that information to trade in breach of a duty owed to the
owner. In other words, such conduct violates Section 10(b) because the misappropriator
engages in deception by pretending ‘loyalty to the principal while secretly converting the
principal’s information for personal gain.’”) (internal citations omitted).
58. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653–55; see also Maio, 51 F.3d at 631 (quoting Cherif,
933 F.2d at 410) (“Under misappropriation theory a person violates Rule 10b-5 by
‘misappropriating and trading upon material information entrusted to him by virtue of a
fiduciary relationship . . . .’”).
59. Compare O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 644-46 with the Supreme Court’s classical “special
relationship” theory adopted in Chiarella, supra notes 34-46 and accompanying text, which
established that a “duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between
parties to a transaction” exists only when directors, officers, and other insiders engage in
trades of their respective company’s securities. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230.
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C. Tipping
Insider trading liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 extends
beyond the primary parties of an insider trading transaction, applying to any
party that disseminates material inside information (“tippers”) and any party
that receives such information (“tippees”), if knowingly and improperly done
for personal gain or to convey a gift.60 Because insider trading liability is
premised on the breach of a requisite duty, “[a]n insider’s disclosure is
improper when corporate information, intended to be available only for
corporate purposes, is used for personal advantage.”61 This breach occurs
when an inside tipper conveys material nonpublic information with the intent
to personally benefit, or to provide a gift to the tippee-recipient. A tippee
incurs liability under Section 10(b) when he utilizes this information
knowing of the inside tipper’s breach.62
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60. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659 (“Not only are insiders forbidden by their fiduciary
relationship from personally using undisclosed corporate information to their advantage, but
they [also] may not give such information to an outsider for the same improper purpose of
exploiting the information for their personal gain.”); accord, Salman v. United States, 137
S.Ct. 420 (2016); see also Hernandez v. U.S., 450 F.Supp.2d 1112, 1118 (C.D. Cal. Jun. 1,
2006) (“[U]nder the standard set forth in Dirks” a tippee can be liable under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10(b)–5 “if the tippee had knowledge of the insider-tipper’s personal gain.”); U.S. v.
Santoro, 647 F.Supp. 153, 170–71 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (“An allegation that the tippee knew of
the tipper’s breach necessarily charges that the tippee knew that the tipper was acting for
personal gain.”) rev’d on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Davidoff, 845 F.2d 1151
(2d Cir. 1988).
61. Maio, 51 F.3d at 632.
62. See Salman, 137 S.Ct. at 428 (stating that the tippee violated Section 10(b) “by
trading on the information with full knowledge that it had been improperly disclosed”). A
relatively recent case involving insider tipping is SEC v. Gupta, No. 11-CV-7566, 2013 WL
3784138 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 17, 2013). This case is one of several causes of action associated with
the hedge fund, Galleon Management. See supra note 44. This specific case involved an
insider trading scheme in which former Goldman Sachs board member Rajat K. Gupta
illegally tipped corporate secrets to former Galleon Management hedge fund manager, Raj
Rajaratnam that were used by Rajaratnam to generate approximately $23 million in both
profits and savings. Gupta, 2013 WL 3784138 at *1.
According to the SEC’s complaint, while serving on the boards of Goldman Sachs
and Proctor & Gamble, Gupta had a variety of business dealings with Rajaratnam and stood
to benefit from his relationship with him. Id. Therefore, in order to gain favor with
Rajaratnam, Gupta illegally tipped Rajaratnam with material and nonpublic information that
Gupta obtained during his official duties at Goldman Sachs and Proctor & Gamble. Id. The
information concerned the quarterly earnings of both companies, as well as a yet unrealized
$5 billion investment that Goldman Sachs had anticipated to receive from Berkshire
Hathaway at the height of the financial crisis. Id. As a result, the SEC alleged that Rajaratnam
was responsible for various trades among certain Galleon funds based on Gupta’s inside
information, and further shared the information with associates at Galleon who were also
responsible for trading based on Gupta’s inside information ahead of public announcements
by the respective companies. Id.
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Unlawful “tipping” under Section 10(b) is premised on whether the
tipper breached a fiduciary duty (or a relationship of trust and confidence)
by communicating the subject information to his tippee(s) and whether the
subject tippee(s) knew of the breach.63 Without such a fiduciary breach, a
tippee is entitled to lawfully trade and/or tip without incurring liability under
Section 10(b).64 According to the Supreme Court, in order for liability to
attach to a tipper/tippee in relation to intentional insider trading, an insider is
deemed to have breached his fiduciary duty by tipping the subject
information when the insider is motivated by the expectation of receiving a
personal benefit.65 Typically, the “personal benefit” in question is of a
pecuniary nature, such as cash or an elevation in social or professional status
that carries the realistic potential to result in future financial benefits.66
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The court found the confidential information discussed between Rajaratnam and
Gupta to be “material.” Id. at *4. The court also found that Gupta, a corporate insider based
on his employment position with Goldman Sachs, had violated his fiduciary duty to his
employer by communicating the information to Rajaratnam. Id. at *11. As a result, both
Rajaratnam and Gupta were held to have violated Rule 10b-5’s prohibition of trading based
on material nonpublic information. Id.
On June 15, 2012, in a parallel criminal case arising out of the same facts, Gupta was
convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud and three counts of securities
fraud. U.S. v. Gupta, 904 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2012), aff’d, 747 F.3d 111 (2d
Cir. 2014). On October 24, 2012, Gupta was sentenced to two years in prison and one year
of supervised release and ordered to pay a $5 million criminal fine. On February 25, 2013,
the court ordered Gupta to pay Goldman restitution of approximately $6.2 million. Id. On
July 17, 2013, the SEC obtained a final judgment ordering Gupta to pay a $13.9 million
penalty and also permanently barring him from serving as an officer or director of a public
company. Gupta, 2013 WL 3784138. Gupta unsuccessfully appealed his conviction. Gupta,
904 F. Supp. 2d 349.
63. Salman, 137 S.Ct. at 428. The Supreme Court’s “should have known” language in
Dirks is puzzling as that language suggests negligent culpability is sufficient for Section 10(b)
liability. But, such cannot be the case as Section 10(b) requires scienter to be proven. The
Court’s language in Salman supports this rationale. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying
text.
64. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662.
65. Id. at 663-64.
66. Id. The Court held that, in addition to the primary parties to an inside trading
transaction, tippers and tippees may also be subject to Section 10(b)’s insider trading
prohibition depending upon whether the tipper will gain a personal benefit from his tip. Id.
Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to stockholders. Id. And, absent
a breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach by the tippee. Id. In this case, Raymond
Dirks, a security analyst, received confidential information from a former officer of an
insurance company called Equity Funding Corporation (EFC). Id. The former officer
informed Dirks that EFC’s stock was grossly over-valued and that the company’s assets were
overstated, due primarily to a high number of fraudulent policies that the company had issued.
Id. at 649. While attempting to ascertain the truth of the allegations, Dirks communicated the
information to (1) the Wall Street Journal and (2) several of his institutional clients. Id. In
regard to the Wall Street Journal, Dirks convinced the publication to write a series of articles
that exposed EFC’s fraud. Id. In regard to the clients of his firm, Dirks advised them (while
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Further, a personal benefit is deemed to have resulted when the insider
conveys the subject information as a gift: the gift of tipping the material and
nonpublic information is likened to trading by the insider himself with the
transfer to the tippee-recipient of the profits generated from the trades.67
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investigating EFC’s fraud, but before the Wall Street Journal published the story) to sell their
outstanding holdings in EFC. Id. Acting on the information that Dirks provided, these clients
sold large amounts of EFC stock in order to avoid the potential losses that would be incurred
when the company’s fraud were to become public and thus likely cause the price of EFC’s
stock to decline. Id. The allegations were confirmed soon after, and EFC subsequently went
into bankruptcy. In response to Dirks’s acts of communicating the material and nonpublic
information regarding EFC to his firm’s clients, the SEC brought suit against Dirks, alleging
that he violated Rule 10b-5. Id. at 650-51. Subsequently, the Supreme Court held that Dirks
did not violate Section 10(b) since the EFC insider had not acted with an improper motive in
conveying the information to Dirks. Rather, his motivation was to provide the information to
Dirks in order to obtain his aid in exposing the fraud. Id. at 666. Further, the Supreme Court
held that a tippee’s duty to disclose or abstain “is derivative from that of the insider’s duty.”
Id. at 659. Thus, a tippee is only liable under Section 10(b) or Rule 10b–5 for trading on the
basis of material and nonpublic information if the inside tipper breached a fiduciary duty in
disclosing to the tippee. See Salman v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 420 (2016) (applying Dirks);
U.S. v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1031 (2d Cir. 1986), aff’d, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (holding that
an individual engages in “misappropriation” for purposes of insider trading laws when he
engages in “conduct constituting secreting, stealing, [or] purloining. . . [of] material nonpublic information in breach of an employer-imposed fiduciary duty of confidentiality.”). In
determining whether the disclosure constituted such a breach of duty, the Court considered
whether the inside tipper personally benefitted directly or indirectly from the disclosure to the
tippee. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662 (concluding that “[a]bsent some personal gain [to the corporate
insider], there has been no breach of duty to stockholders”). The Court stated that “[n]ot only
are insiders forbidden by their fiduciary relationship from personally using undisclosed
corporate information to their advantage, but they also may not give such information to an
outsider for the same improper purpose of exploiting the information for their personal gain.”
Id. at 659–60 (emphasis added); see also SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756, 765 (W.D. Okla.
Jul 2, 1984) (holding that the Supreme Court’s decision in Dirks “pointed out that, unlike
insiders who have independent fiduciary duties to both the corporation and its shareholders,
the typical tippee has no such fiduciary relationship”).
67. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664. Each theory of insider trading also may incur different
elements for tipping liability. For instance, under the classical “special relationship” theory
of insider trading, fraudulent insider trading occurs when a corporate insider trades in the
securities of the company to which the corporate insider owes a fiduciary duty when the trades
are made on the basis of material and nonpublic information. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651-52.
This theory applies not only to officers, directors, and other permanent insiders of a company
but applies also to temporary “quasi-insiders” who may become fiduciaries of the company
as a result of their capacity in service to the company (e.g., attorneys, accountants, consultants,
etc.). Id. at 652. Under the misappropriation theory of insider trading, if a person who is
liable for misappropriating confidential information subsequently “tips” another person, the
“tippee” also is liable under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 if the tippee trades on the basis of
the information if the tippee was aware of the tipper’s breach of fiduciary duty to the tipper’s
source of the information. Id. The Dirks court held that, to be liable under Section 10(b), “an
inside tipper must gain some personal advantage in order for an outside tippee to be liable for
trading on material nonpublic information.” SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1334 (11th Cir.
1998).
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Liability for tipping related to insider trading hinges on establishing that
the tipper-defendant gained a personal benefit from her actions.68 As an
essential element of tipping liability, the requirement of the knowing receipt
of a personal benefit is a significant cause of the existing void that exists as
this element mandates that the defendant act intentionally.69 To fill this void
of liability, a cause of action for insider trading-related tipping should exist
between “no liability” and “intentional liability” that requires proof of a
defendant’s negligence.
II.

AN UNTAPPED REMEDY — SECTION 17(A) OF THE SECURITIES
ACT

A. Overview
Similar to Section 10(b), the language of Section 17(a) of the Securities
Act does not specifically proscribe insider trading.70 With some frequency,
the SEC has pursued insider trading enforcement actions based upon the
authority granted by this statute, and, in particular, ordinarily under Section
17(a)(1).71 Congress enacted the Securities Act in direct response to the
market crash of 1929 in order to promote investor protection, help ensure
fair dealing, and enhance ethical business standards of honesty and fair
dealing in regard to securities transactions.72 As discussed above, Section

04/17/2017 09:23:23

C M
Y K

39057-ple_19-2 reissue Sheet No. 12 Side B

68. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664.
69. See id. (noting that an inference of personal benefit may be drawn based on, inter
alia, “an intention to benefit the particular recipient”).
70. See supra note 46 for the text of the statute.
71. Like Section 10(b), Section 17(a)(1) requires proof of the defendant’s scienter. See
Aaron, 446 U.S. at 695-96 (1980) (determining that the statutory language of 17(a)(1) implies
a scienter requirement). Without invoking any specific clause, the SEC has alleged violations
of Section 17(a) in several landmark insider trading cases. In Dirks, the SEC held that Dirks,
by tipping, had aided and abetted the Section 17(a) violations of his selling tippees. See Dirks,
463 U.S. at 650-51. Although the D.C. Circuit affirmed the SEC’s censure of Dirks and the
Supreme Court reversed the censure, neither court separately discussed the application of
Section 17(a); instead, both focused on the application of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Id.
at 653-67; Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 833-846 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In Cady, Roberts & Co.,
the SEC held that the insider trading defendants violated both Section 17(a) and Section 10(b).
40 SEC at 911.
For examples of more recent proceedings in which the SEC alleged that an insider
trading defendant violated Section 17(a), see Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1; Adler, 137 F.3d 1325;
Maio, 51 F.3d 623; SEC v. Aragon Capital Mgmt., LLC, 672 F. Supp. 2d 421 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
24, 2009); Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713; SEC v. Anton, 2009 WL 1109324 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23,
2009); Lyon, 529 F. Supp. 2d 444; SEC v. Svoboda, 409 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3,
2006); Causey, Litigation Release No. 18776, 83 SEC Docket 850, 2004 WL 1531843 (Jul.
8, 2004).
72. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (noting
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17(a)(3) forbids “any person in the offer or sale of any securities” from
engaging in any practice or transaction that would “directly or indirectly . . .
operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.”73 Based on this language,
the SEC has invoked Section 17(a)(3) to a minimal extent in its pursuit of
alleged insider trading violators.74 Perhaps surprisingly, to date, courts have
given relatively little attention to the effect of this statute’s application to
insider trading. In those instances where courts have analyzed the
application of Section 17(a)(3), they frequently do so concurrently, and with
deference to, prior interpretations of Rule 10b-575 — perhaps under the
incorrect perception that the two provisions are substantially similar.76
Although a few courts have treated the three subsections of Section
17(a) as all being applicable to the same types of misconduct in the offer or
sale of securities, courts generally have interpreted the three subsections as
proscribing different types of misconduct.77 Specifically, most courts agree
that subsections (a)(1) and (a)(3) are applicable to scenarios involving
“scheme” liability, as subsection (a)(1) prohibits employing “any device,
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that a fundamental purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 “was to substitute a philosophy of
full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of
business ethics in the securities industry”) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2),
quoted in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 430 (1953). See also Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768
(explaining that the Securities Act was passed in the aftermath of the market crash in 1929
“to achieve a high standard of business ethics . . . in every aspect of the securities industry”)
(quoting Capital Gains Bureau, 375 U.S. at 186-87); Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 195 (“The
Securities Act of 1933 . . . was designed to . . . protect investors against fraud and . . . to
promote ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing.”).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3). See supra note 46 for the text of the entire statute.
74. There have been a small number of insider trading cases in which a defendant agreed
to settle to a lesser charge of negligence under Section 17(a)(3). See, e.g., In re Bolan, 2015
SEC LEXIS 2201; SEC v. Shared Med. Sys. Corp., Litig. Rel. No. 14130, 56 SEC Docket
2624, 1994 SEC LEXIS 1947 (June 22, 1994).
75. See Maio, 51 F.3d at 631 (applying concurrently Section 17(a)(3) and Rule 10b-5).
76. See Aragon, 672 F. Supp. 2d at 432 (“The elements required to establish violations
of Sections 10(b) and 17(a) are ‘essentially the same.’”) (quoting SEC v. Monarch Funding
Corp., 192 F.3d 295, 308 (2d Cir. 1999)), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 650 F.3d 156 (2d Cir.
2011); see also Wright v. Schock, 571 F. Supp. 642, 662 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (“The scienter
requirement is the same in the two [S]ections [10(b) and 17(a)].”) (citing and misinterpreting
Aaron), aff’d on other grounds, 742 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1984).
77. See, e.g., Monarch Funding Corp., 192 F.3d at 308 (“Essentially the same elements
[as those required to show a violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5] are required under
Section 17(a)(1)-(3) in connection with the offer or sale of a security[.]”); see also In re John
P. Flannery & James D. Hopkins, No. 3-14081 at 16 n.86 (SEC Dec. 15, 2014) (stating that
Section 17(a) “is in many respects broader than [S]ection 10(b), the Section 17(a) claims could
survive even absent deceptive conduct by the defendant himself”) (citing Klamberg v. Roth,
473 F. Supp. 544, 556 (S.D.N.Y. Jun 22, 1979)), rev’d on other grounds, 810 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2015).
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scheme, or artifice to defraud”78 and subsection (a)(3) prohibits engaging in
“any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.”79 On the other hand,
subsection (a)(2) is applicable to scenarios involving misrepresentation and
half-truth liability, thus making it unlawful to obtain money or property by
means of any materially false statement or half-truth of a material fact.80
Despite the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Section 17(a)(3) that the
statute encompasses negligent conduct,81 it has been underutilized, and when
rarely invoked, courts have often analyzed it concurrently with Rule 10b-5.82
While the language of Section 17(a)(2) and (a)(3) resemble provisions in
Rule 10b-5, the Supreme Court has concluded in Aaron v. SEC that although
a scienter requirement applies to Section 10(b) and Section 17(a)(1), there is
no such requirement of scienter with respect to Section 17(a)(2) and (3).83 In
Aaron, the Supreme Court held that, in order to prove a violation of Section
17(a)(3) of the Securities Act, the SEC need only prove that the defendant
acted with negligence.84 According to the Court, Section 17(a)(3) “quite
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78. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1); see Aaron, 446 U.S. 680 (applying § 17(a)(1) to petitioner’s
scheme to defraud potential investors); Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (applying § 17(a)(1) to
respondent’s scheme to defraud brokers).
79. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3).
80. See, e.g., SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340, 343-45 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2011) (“To
succeed on a misstatement claim under . . . Section 17(a)(2), the SEC must prove that the
defendant made materially false statements or omissions.”) (emphasis in original) (citations
omitted); see also SEC v. Bank of America Corp., 2014 WL 2777434 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 31
2014) (applying 17(a)(2) to defendant banks who knowingly failed to disclose to investors the
risks associated with mortgage backed securities), aff’d, SEC v. Bank of America Corp., 2014
WL 2778498 (W.D.N.C. 2014).
81. Aaron, 446 U.S. at 696-97.
82. See generally Monarch Funding Corp., 192 F.3d at 308; Maio, 51 F.3d 623; Aragon,
672 F. Supp. 2d at 432; Wright, 571 F. Supp. At 662 (“The scienter requirement is the same
in the two [S]ections [10(b) and 17(a)].”).
83. 446 U.S. at 695-97; see also SEC v. GLT Dain Rascher, Inc., 254 F.3d 852, 856 (9th
Cir. 2001); SEC v. Hughes Capital Corp., 124 F.3d 449, 454 (3d Cir. 1997); SEC v. First
Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1467 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 812 (1997);
Svoboda, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 342 (“[T]he facts underlying their Section 10(b) convictions [of
two insider trading defendants] establish civil liability under Section 17(a). . . . The Second
Circuit has explained that ‘essentially the same elements’ are required to prove fraud under
Section 17(a) as are required under Section 10(b), ‘though no showing of scienter is required
for the SEC to obtain an injunction under subsections (a)(2) or (a)(3) [of Section 17].’”) (citing
Monarch Funding Corp., 192 F.3d at 308); SEC v. Soroosh, 1997 WL 487434 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 5, 1997) (insider trading case), aff’d, 166 F.3d 343 (9th Cir. 1998) (unpublished
decision); John H. Sturc & Catherine W. Cummer, Possession v. Use for Insider Trading
Liability, 12 INSIGHTS: THE CORPORATE & SECURITIES LAW ADVISOR 6, Jun. 1998, at 3 (“Thus,
in theory, liability could be imposed under Section 17(a) for a kind of ‘negligent’ trading
while in possession of inside information.”).
84. Aaron, 446 U.S. at 697.
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plainly focuses upon the effect of particular conduct on members of the
investing public, rather than upon the culpability of the person
responsible.”85 As a result, the combined use of each of these individual
provisions provides the SEC with the ability to enforce violations of
securities laws and pursue causes of action based on different standards of
mental culpability — either the higher standard of scienter or the lower
standard of negligence, depending on the facts and circumstances
presented.86 However, the use of Section 17(a)’s provisions has been
primarily focused on enforcement of schemes involving fraud or market
manipulation — not insider trading.87 One may wonder why has the SEC
neglected to use this powerful weapon in its “war” on insider trading.88
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85. Id. Further, the Supreme Court held that Section 17(a)(3) “does not require a
‘showing [of] deliberate dishonesty as a condition precedent to protecting investors.’” Id.
(quoting Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. at 200).
86. See supra notes 7-26 and accompanying text; see also Corey v. Bache & Co., 355
F.Supp. 1123 (S.D. W.Va. Mar. 12, 1973) (decided prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Aaron, explaining that Section 17(a) and Rule 10b-5 may be applied “to negligent as well as
intentional representations”).
87. See SEC v. Geotek, 426 F.Supp. 715 (1976), aff’d 590 F.2d 785 (applying negligence
standard, i.e., ordinary care or due diligence, in resolving claims asserted by Commission in
statutory enforcement proceedings, specifically, claims that defendants made material
misstatements and/or omissions in prospectuses, limited partnership agreements and
management agreements as well as in offering circulars and program agreements for joint
ventures and in certain program receipts and disbursement financial statements and that
certified public accountant made material misrepresentations and/or omissions in its audit
certifications of the financial statements). In re John P. Flannery & James D. Hopkins was a
case where the SEC found the respondent, John P. Flannery liable under Section 17(a)(3) as
a result of the defendants’ lack of adequate disclosure in two letters to investors for which the
defendant was “negligent with respect to his contributions to and approval of . . .” No. 314081 (SEC Dec. 15, 2014) at 45, rev’d on other grounds, 810 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2015).
Although Flannery was not shown to have acted with scienter, he was found liable for
negligently misleading investors based on the fact that the Commission found that “the danger
of misleading investors was not so obvious that Flannery ‘must have been’ aware of it.” Id.
at 45 (emphasis added) (citing SEC v. Platforms Wireless Intern. Corp., 617 F.3d 1072, 109394 (9th Cir. 2010)). In its decision, the Commission found that, contrary to Section 10(b),
Section 17(a) does not contain language that requires the proscribed conduct to be
“manipulative or deceptive.” Id. In other words, there is “no textual basis” for concluding
that Section 17(a) requires that the defendant’s violative conduct itself be “manipulative or
deceptive” as is required under Rule 10b-5. Furthermore, the Commission stated that, based
on the Supreme Court’s holding in Ernst & Ernst, the words “manipulative or deceptive” in
conjunction with “device or contrivance” strongly suggest that Section 10(b)’s sole purpose
is “‘to proscribe knowing or intentional’ – rather than negligent – misconduct.” Id. at 22-23
(citing Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 197). Subsequently, the First Circuit overturned the ruling
and held that the agency’s decision was “not supported by substantial evidence.” Flannery v.
SEC, 810 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2015).
88. See supra note 26.
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B. Differences Between Section 10(b) and Section 17(a)
Although Section 17(a) and the more familiar Section 10(b) share many
similarities in language and structure, the two provisions are different in
important ways.89 Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 cover
proscribed misconduct “in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.”90 In contrast, liability under Section 17(a) is limited to acts “in the
offer or sale of any securities.”91 The result of this contrasting language is
that Section 10(b) is interpreted to apply to purchases and sales while Section
17(a) is interpreted to apply to sales or offers to sell only.92
The wording of Section 17(a) is further different than the wording of
Section 10(b).93 Contrary to Section 10(b), Section 17(a) does not contain
language that requires the proscribed conduct to be “manipulative or
deceptive.” In other words, as stated by the SEC, there is “no textual basis
for concluding that Rule 10b-5’s requirement that the defendant’s violative

refers to fraud or misrepresentation “in the offer or sale of any securities.” It is
perhaps arguable that this does not limit the application of the Section to cases of
fraud by sellers as distinct from fraud by buyers of securities—that it was
intended merely to make it clear that § 17(a), in contrast to the mail fraud statute,
is restricted to the securities field. However, the Commission has never sought
to apply § 17(a) except against fraudulent sellers.

Id. at 839 (emphasis in original). Although this argument may be viable with respect to
Section 17(a)(1) and 17(a)(2), it is not regarding Section 17(a)(3) due to that provision’s clear
language that the fraud or deceit must be “upon the purchaser.” 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3).
93. See In re Cady, 40 SEC. at 911 n.11:
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The language of Rule 10b-5 is broader in several respects than that of Section
17(a) of the Securities Act. Thus, while Section 17(a) prohibits fraudulent or
deceptive practices “in the offer or sale” of any security, Rule 10b-5 prohibits
such activities “in connection with the purchase or sale” of any security.
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89. Note that the parameters of Rule 10b-5 are confined by the statute upon which it is
based – namely, Section 10(b); see Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472-73
(1977) (“The rulemaking power granted to an administrative agency charged with the
administration of a federal statute is not the power to make law. Rather, it is ‘the power to
adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute.’”)
(quoting Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 213-14); see generally Ralph C. Ferrara and Marc I.
Steinberg, A Reappraisal of Santa Fe: Rule 10b-5 and the New Federalism, 129 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 263 (1980). While essentially the same elements are required to prove fraud under both
Section 17(a) and Section 10(b), there is no requirement to prove scienter under Section
17(a)(2) or (a)(3). See Aaron, 446 U.S. at 696-97.
90. 15 U.S.C. § 78j.
91. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a).
92. See, e.g., SEC v. Namer, 2004 WL 2199471, at *9-*10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2004);
SEC v. Roor, 2004 WL 1933578, at *13-*15 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2004); SEC v. McCaskey,
2001 WL 1029053, at *4–*5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2001). In his treatise Fundamentals of
Securities Regulation (1988), Professor Louis Loss, the premier securities scholar of his era,
commented that Section 17(a):
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conduct itself be ‘manipulative or deceptive’ also applies to Section 17(a).”94
Based on the wording of Section 17(a), the Supreme Court has held that,
while scienter is the required mens rea for a violation under Section 17(a)(1),
it is not the case for violations of Section 17(a)(2) and (a)(3).95 Rather, a
showing of negligence is sufficient to establish a violation under these
provisions.96
C. Proposed Amendment
The SEC thus is empowered to institute a claim of insider trading
against a defendant under Section 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) without the
requirement of proving that the defendant acted knowingly or intentionally
– in other words, that the defendant acted negligently.97 However, Section
17(a)(2) is not an effective weapon against insider trading due to its narrow
application to “untrue statement” liability.98 That statute is inapplicable to
the insider trading scenario since a typical insider trade is not premised on
an affirmative “untrue statement.” Rather, it is assessed on “scheme”
liability or the trader’s omission of a statement. Insider trading involves
nondisclosure rather than the making of affirmative statements.99
The scope of Section 17(a)(3) covers fraudulent sales but does not cover
fraudulent purchases. Thus, Section 17(a)(3) reaches defendants who
constructively defraud purchasers, but Section 17(a)(3)’s scope does not
cover defendants that defraud sellers.100 Section 17(a)(3)’s scope also
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94. In re Flannery, No. 3-14081 (Dec. 15, 2014), rev’d on other grounds, 810 F.3d 1 (1st
Cir. 2015). However, this is not accurate for Section 17(a)(1). Also, this is not to suggest
that Section 17(a) reaches breaches of fiduciary duty where there is no disclosure deficiency.
See generally Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. 462; Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1.
95. Aaron, 446 U.S. at 697.
96. Id.
97. Note that Section 17(a)(2) normally is inapplicable to insider trading as the defendant
trader or tippee does not make a statement. Hence, because Section 17(a)(2) focuses on
material misrepresentations and half-truths, that provision does not extend to deceptive
conduct based on silence. See generally In re Flannery, Release No. 3981, 2014 WL
7145625, rev’d on other grounds, 810 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2015). See supra note 87.
98. See generally STEINBERG & WANG, supra note 3.
99. Contra Dirks, 47 SEC 434, 448 n. 51 (1981) (“And all of our findings against Dirks
[a tippee/tipper] are made under both those Sections [17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3)].”), rev’d on other
grounds, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). But cf. SEC v. Davis, 689 F. Supp. 767, 773-74 (S.D. Ohio
Mar. 29, 1988) (refusing to dismiss a complaint against insider trading defendant based in
part on Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3)—defendant did not argue specifically that Section
17(a)(2) did not apply).
100. See Aaron, 446 U.S. 680 (reading the language of § 17(a) to indicate that scienter is
not required under § 17(a)(2) and (3)). It should also be noted that Section 17(a) is modeled
on the federal mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (enacted 1872). Robert A. Prentice,
Scheme Liability: Does it Have a Future After Stoneridge?, 2009 WISC. L. REV. 351, 365 n.
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77. See also In re Cady supra note 93, at 837-39. Applying language in that statute similar
to Section 17(a), the Second Circuit has held that the statute does not require that “the
defendant must receive the same money or property that the deceived party lost, but only that
the party deceived must lose money or property.” United States v. Evans, 844 F.2d 36, 3940 (2d Cir. 1988); see also Kelling v. United States, 193 F.2d 299 (10th Cir. 1951) (concluding
that in prosecution on counts charging violations of Section 17(a), which prohibits
employment of any device, scheme or artifice to defraud in sale of securities by use of means
of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by use of mails directly or
indirectly, and § 1341 of Title 18, which prohibits use of mails to execute scheme or artifice
to defraud or obtain money by fraudulent representations, evidence sustained findings that
defendants knowingly made false representations for purpose of effectuating a scheme to
defraud, that representations were relied on causing loss and that defendant used means and
instruments of transportation in commerce and the mails in perpetrating certain frauds).
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extends to tipping that constructively defrauds purchasers. Accordingly, a
tip that generates a defendant’s sale (resulting from bearish inside
information known as the “bad news” scenario), could violate the statute
while a tip that induces a defendant’s purchase (resulting from bullish inside
information known as the “good news” scenario), would not violate the
statute.
With a minimal legislative amendment to modify Section 17(a)’s
language to more closely resemble the language of Rule 10b-5, Section
17(a)(3) would allow the SEC to cast a wider net to enforce insider trading
violations against a broader range of misconduct. Firstly, the word “offer”
should be replaced in the text preceding all three clauses of Section 17(a)
with “purchase” (as in Section 10(b)). By doing so, Section 17(a) will be
applicable to scenarios in which misconduct is engaged in by means of either
a purchase or a sale, thereby broadening the statute’s current scope of
liability (which is limited only to misconduct perpetrated by means of an
“offer or sale”). Secondly, adding the phrase “or the offer thereof” following
the revised language of “purchase or sale of any securities,” Section 17(a)(3)
will be applicable to scenarios in which misconduct occurred irrespective of
whether the contemplated transaction is completed. Thirdly, the language of
Section 17(a)(3) should be amended by replacing the words “fraud . . . upon
the purchaser” with “fraud . . . upon any person” (as in Rule 10b-5(c)).
Pursuant to the proposed amendment, Section 17(a)(3) would then be
applicable to scenarios in which any person, regardless of whether he or she
was a purchaser or seller, was a victim of negligent deficient disclosure
committed by means of either a purchase or sale, further broadening Section
17(a)(3)’s scope. Thus, the suggested amended version of Section 17(a)
reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the purchase or sale of any
securities, or the offer thereof, by the use of any means or
instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
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commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly—
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement
of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person.101

With these changes to the statute, the amended Section 17(a)(3) would
broaden the statute’s scope of liability as a government right of action. The
impact of the proposed statute would not implicate private rights of action,
as courts have declined to imply a private remedy for violations of Section
17(a).102 Consequently, the concern that expanding the scope of an antifraud
statute would facilitate the onset of private claims does not arise under the
proposed amendment.103
In addition to being similar to the language of Rule 10b-5(c), the
resulting language of the proposed amendment would also resemble Section
206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, which provides in pertinent
part:
It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, by use of the mails
or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly
or indirectly (1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client
or prospective client; [or]
(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business
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101. 15 U.S.C. § 77q.
102. No private right of action exists for a violation of Section 17(a)(3). While several
older cases imply such a private right of action, (See, e.g., Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97, 99
(4th Cir. 1975)), subsequent court decisions have consistently declined to follow suit. See,
e.g., Finkel v. Stratton Corp., 962 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1992); Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines
& Jones, 913 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1990); Sears v. Likens, 912 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1990);
Newcome v. Esrey, 862 F. 2d 1099 (4th Cir. 1988); Currie v. Cayman Res. Corp., 835 F.2d
780 (11th Cir. 1988); Krause v. Prettyman, 827 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1987); In re Washington
Pub. Power Supply Sec. Litig., 823 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc)).
103. See Landry v. All Am. Assurance Co., 688 F.2d 381, 391 (5th Cir. 1982) (“[I]t would
appear that the Cort test as applied to § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 points away from
the implication of a private cause of action. This, together with the Supreme Court’s
conservative interpretation of the test in recent years, leads us to the conclusion that the district
court correctly dismissed this theory of relief [thereby denying the existence of a § 17(a)
private right of action]”). See also Cort v. Ash, 422 US 66 (1975) (establishing a four-prong
test for determining whether a private right of action can be inferred under a particular statute);
Marc I. Steinberg, Implied Private Rights of Action Under Federal Law, 55 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 33 (1979) (discussing alterations made to the Cort test by subsequent Supreme Court
case law).
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which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective
client; . . .104

Although this statute is applicable only to investment advisers, its
language is substantially similar to Section 17(a). Furthermore, court
interpretations of Section 206(2) hold that a violation of this statute “may
rest on a finding of simple negligence.”105 In this manner, Section 206 is
broader than Section 10(b). For instance, unlike Section 10(b), which is
limited to situations involving deception or manipulation in connection with
the purchase or sale of a security, Section 206 may extend to negligent
conduct that is deemed to constitute constructive fraud.106
Based on Section 17(a)(3)’s current statutory language, buttressed by
the comparable language of Section 206(2), Section 17(a)(3) now provides
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104. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6.
105. SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 643 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citing Capital Gains
Research Bureau, 375 U.S. at 191). Capital Gains Research Bureau is a significant case in
regard to the interpretation of the Investment Advisers Act. 375 U.S. 180. According to the
House Report on the Investment Advisers Act, one of the goals of the Advisers Act was “to
protect the public from the frauds and misrepresentations of unscrupulous tipsters and touts
and to safeguard the honest investment adviser against the stigma of the activities of these
individuals by making fraudulent practices by investment advisers unlawful.” H.R. Rep. No.
2639, at 28 (1940). In order to achieve this goal, Congress enacted a handful of broad
antifraud provisions intended to eliminate conflicts of interest through full disclosure. See
SEC, FINANCIAL PLANNERS: REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION TO THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE’S SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND FINANCE, at A-7 (1988). However, the Advisers Act did not
originally define the fiduciary duty nor the standard of care that investment advisers owed to
their clients. This changed in 1963 when the Supreme Court interpreted the Advisers Act as,
in fact, establishing federal fiduciary standards for investment advisers. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180. Drawing on the Act’s “broad proscription against any
practice which operates as a fraud or deceit upon” the client, as well as Congress’s intent to
“preserve the personalized character of the services of investment advisers and to eliminate
conflicts of interest between the investment adviser and the clients,” the Court concluded that
the Advisers Act “reflects a congressional recognition of the delicate fiduciary nature of an
investment advisory relationship. . . .” Id. at 191–92 (internal quotations and alterations
omitted); see also Transamerica Mortg. Adv., Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 17 (1979) (“As we
have previously recognized, § 206 [of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940] establishes
‘federal fiduciary standards’ to govern the conduct of investment advisers. . .”) (internal
citations omitted); see also 17 C.F.R. § 204(4)-8 (2007); Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to
Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles, Investment Advisors, 72 Fed. Reg. 44,756 (Aug. 9,
2007) (stating that § 204(4)-8 “prohibits advisers to pooled investment vehicles from making
false or misleading statements to, or otherwise defrauding, investors or prospective investors
in those pooled vehicles”). Under this rule, the SEC has indicated that it will apply a
negligence standard. Id. at 44,759.
106. As a general matter, the SEC may bring an enforcement action under Section 206
even if there is no actual injury to a client or investor. See, e.g., SEC v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706,
711 (6th Cir. 1985) (“Violations of the antifraud provisions of Sections 206 of the Investment
Advisers Act also do not depend on actual injury to any client.”).
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the SEC with authority in certain circumstances to pursue negligent inside
traders107—namely, when a person negligently sells securities to a purchaser
while the seller is in possession of adverse material nonpublic information
(as contrasted with intentional insider trading, in which a person trades while
aware of material, nonpublic information regarding the security).108 The
wherewithal to bring insider trading charges based on negligence represents
a significantly lighter burden than the scienter requirement of Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5.109 Therefore, Section 17(a)(3)’s lower mental culpability
level, accompanied with the suggested amendment, would provide the SEC
with an important enforcement tool whenever the applicable facts are
insufficient to prove scienter.
D. The Proposed Amendment Will Not Lead to Vexatious Litigation
Critics of the proposed amendment to Section 17(a)(3) may contend that
the proposed amendment, by encompassing negligent insider trading, would
open the floodgates for plaintiff-investors to bring nuisance claims. As
discussed above, this argument is untenable; contrary to Section 10(b), no
private right of action exists for a violation of Section 17(a)(3). Although a
number of older cases implied such a private right of action,110 subsequent
appellate court decisions have consistently declined to imply a private
remedy.111 Applying the Supreme Court’s strict statutory construction to
implied rights of action,112 lower courts — for well over three decades —
have held that Congress did not intend to create a private right of action under
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107. See Svoboda, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 342.
108. See supra notes 8-25 and accompanying text; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1
(2000), which provides:
(a) General. The “manipulative and deceptive devices” prohibited by Section 10(b) of
the Act (15 U.S.C. 78j) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 thereunder include, among other
things, the purchase or sale of a security of any issuer, on the basis of material nonpublic
information about that security or issuer, in breach of a duty of trust or confidence that
is owed directly, indirectly, or derivatively, to the issuer of that security or the
shareholders of that issuer, or to any other person who is the source of the material
nonpublic information.
109. See Aaron, 446 U.S. at 701 (requiring a showing of “scienter,” or intent, in Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 enforcement actions).
110. See, e.g., Newman, 518 F.2d at 99 (4th Cir. 1975); Valles Salgado v. Piedmont
Capital Corp., 452 F. Supp. 853, 857 (D.P.R. 1978); Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869,
879 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
111. See, e.g., supra note 101.
112. See Transamerica, 444 U.S. 11 (construing two sections of the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 strictly in finding a limited private remedy); see also Cort, 422 U.S. 66 (holding
that no private cause of action is implied from a criminal statute prohibiting certain
expenditures in corporate elections).
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Section 17(a).113
III.

NEGLIGENT INSIDER TRADING UNDER SECTION 17(A)(3)

As set forth above, negligence is sufficient to constitute a violation of
Section 17(a)(3).114 The language of Section 17(a)(3) prohibits engaging in
“any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.”115 Therefore, pursuant to
Section 17(a)(3)’s current language, the SEC must prove that a negligent
offer or sale occurred when the defendant was in possession of material and
nonpublic information, thereby acting as a fraud “upon the purchaser.”116
Such misconduct ordinarily occurs where the alleged violator sells securities
in order to avoid a loss (i.e., the “bad news” situation).
Liability for negligent insider trading is premised upon a combination
of three legal concepts: (1) common law negligence;117 (2) constructive
negligent fraud118 (as interpreted by case law in which the SEC has invoked
Section 17(a)(3)119); and (3) case law that has established the elements of
113. See, e.g., Landry, 688 F.2d at 391.
114. See Aaron, 446 U.S. 680 (holding the SEC does not need to establish scienter under
Section 17(a)(3)).
115. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3).
116. See Russell G. Ryan, Recent SEC Insider Trading Settlements Reflect Promising
Signs of Flexibility, 20 INSIGHTS: THE CORPORATE & SECURITIES LAW ADVISOR 4, Apr. 2006,
at 2 (“In cases when the unlawful [insider] trade was a sale of securities, the SEC typically
adds a charge under Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 . . .”).
117. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “Negligence” as:

Negligence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
118. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “Fraud” as:

2. A reckless misrepresentation made without justified belief in its truth to induce
another person to act.
3. A tort arising from a knowing or reckless misrepresentation or concealment of
material fact made to induce another to act to his or her detriment . . .
4. Unconscionable dealing . . . the unfair use of the power arising out of the
parties’ relative positions and resulting in an unconscionable bargain.
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Fraud, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added)). Further, the subentry
of constructive fraud is defined as “1. Unintentional deception or misrepresentation that
causes injury to another.” Id.
119. See Bank of America Corp., 2014 WL 2777434. The SEC filed a complaint against

39057-ple_19-2 reissue Sheet No. 17 Side B

The failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person
would have exercised in a similar situation; any conduct that falls below the legal
standard established to protect others against unreasonable risk of harm, except
for conduct that is intentionally, wantonly, or willfully disregardful of others’
rights; the doing of what a reasonable and prudent person would not do under the
particular circumstances, or the failure to do what such a person would do under
the circumstances.
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unlawful insider trading.120 Although Section 17(a)(3) is limited to the “offer
or sale of any securities,” the statute is clear in its prohibition of “any
transaction” that “operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit.”121 Since
an improper insider trade is a “transaction” that “operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit,” insider trading falls within the category of transactions
that Section 17(a)(3) prohibits (albeit limited only to sales). Accordingly, as
held by the Supreme Court, an actionable disclosure deficiency under
Section 17(a)(3) is subject to a mens rea of negligence122 and focuses “upon
the effect of particular conduct on members of the investing public, rather
than upon the culpability of the person responsible.”123 Thus, in addition to
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several subsidiaries of Bank of America based on allegations of material misrepresentations
and omissions made by the defendants in a prospectus and prospectus supplement issued for
residential mortgage backed securities offered and underwritten by the defendants. Id. at *4.
In 2008, the defendants offered and underwrote certificates that provided investors a right of
payment from a pool of residential mortgages. Id. at *2. The final loan pool included 1,191
adjustable rate mortgages, each of which generally consisted of a principal of more than
$417,000. Id. at *3, n. 1. Prior to filing the prospectus and prospectus supplement in January
of 2008, the defendants provided preliminary information to investing banks claiming that
approximately seventy percent of the final loan pool of the securities had been originated from
the “‘wholesale channel,’ or third party mortgage brokers.” Id. at *1. However, when the
defendants later filed the prospectus and prospectus supplement, the defendants contradicted
their description of the mortgage characteristics by stating that only “some” of the mortgages
contained in the final loan pool had been originated in the wholesale channel as opposed to
the original description of “approximately seventy percent” having been originated. Id. In
fact, seventy-two percent of the mortgages originated in the wholesale channel, representing
a high degree of risk to investors. Id. at *3. As a result, the SEC alleged that, by failing to
disclose the true nature of the loans that comprised the loan pool, and by failing to disclose
the potential risks associated with this type of security, the defendants had acted negligently.
Id. at *4. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the charges alleged by the SEC based on
the argument that the Complaint failed to plead sufficient facts to establish negligence (as the
sufficient mens rea under Section 17(a)(3)). Id. at *8. In denying the defendants’ motion, the
court addressed the sufficiency of the SEC’s allegations to satisfy the negligence requirement
of Section 17(a)(3). Id. Specifically, the court held that the SEC adequately alleged sufficient
facts under Section 17(a)(3) that defendants had negligently misrepresented and failed to
disclose information that the defendants “knew or reasonably should have known . . . was
material.” Id. at *11.
120. See supra notes 34-67 and accompanying text.
121. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3).
122. See, e.g., Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (finding no ambiguity in the wording of Section
17(a) and reversing the appellate court’s decision).
123. Aaron, 446 U.S at 697 (emphasis omitted). Further, “[t]his reading follows directly
from Capital Gains, which attributed to a similarly worded provision in § 206(2) of the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 a meaning that does not require a ‘showing [of] deliberate
dishonesty as a condition precedent to protecting investors.’” Id. (quoting Capital Gains
Research Bureau, 375 U.S. at 200). The Supreme Court has also stated that “Congress
intended securities legislation enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds to be construed ‘not
technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purpose.’” Affiliated Ute
Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (quoting Capital Gains Research
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prosecuting insider trading claims under Rule 10b-5 — where scienter must
be proven — the current version of Section 17(a)(3) empowers the SEC to
pursue a negligent insider trading cause of action against defendants who
engage in proscribed conduct in the “offer or sale” of securities (such as an
insider who sells stock in order to avoid a loss — the “bad news” scenario).124
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Bureau, 375 U.S. at 195).
124. One insider trading case in which the insider was the seller and the SEC failed to
successfully prosecute under Rule 10b-5, but may have successfully prosecuted under the
current version of Section 17(a)(3) under a theory of negligence, is SEC v. Moshayedi, (Civil
Action No. 12-cv-01179 (C.D. Cal Jun. 6, 2014)). In Moshayedi, the SEC brought an insider
trading suit against Manouchehr Moshayedi, the co-founder and CEO of STEC Inc., a
company that manufactures and sells computer storage devices. The alleged insider trades
that Moshayedi transacted were in advance of a STEC secondary offering in which, according
to the SEC, Moshayedi sold a substantial portion of his company’s stock while in possession
of material and nonpublic information regarding one of STEC’s largest customers.
According to the SEC’s complaint: during an eight-month period beginning in
January 2009, STEC stock increased in price over 800 percent due to increased profits and
sales margins. During this period, STEC also announced an agreement with its largest
customer, EMC Corp., to supply STEC’s top-selling product – flash drives. Moshayedi and
his brother Mark allegedly planned to take advantage of the stock’s price increase by selling
a large block of their shares in a secondary offering that was scheduled to coincide with the
release of STEC’s second-quarter results. Complaint, SEC v. Moshayedi, Civil Action No.
12-CV-01179, at 2-3.
Shortly before the secondary offering, EMC informed Moshayedi that it would not
enter into another similar agreement with STEC for the third quarter of 2009. Moshayedi also
received an internal report indicating that EMC’s actual demand for the flash drives in the last
two quarters of the year would not be sufficient to ensure that STEC would meet guidance or
the consensus analyst estimates. The SEC alleged that, after learning these facts, Moshayedi
engaged in a “fraudulent scheme to conceal” EMC’s actual demand so that the planned
secondary offering could proceed. The “scheme to conceal” consisted of a secret deal with
EMC in which EMC committed to purchase a larger quantity of flash drives from STEC
(allegedly more than was required or necessary) in the third quarter of 2009 at a substantial
discount. After this deal was in place, Moshayedi announced guidance for the third quarter
that met the consensus estimate. That guidance included proceeds from the secret deal that
were more than twice as much as EMC’s forecasted demand for the quarter. The SEC alleged
that these guidance numbers were only possible because of the secret deal between STEC and
EMC. Id. at 3-4.
The secondary offering proceeded as scheduled. Moshayedi and his brothers each
sold 4.5 million shares of STEC stock. Three months later, in connection with the release of
its third quarter earnings results, STEC disclosed that EMC had not disposed of a substantial
amount of inventory purchased from STEC, and would therefore, possibly continue to carry
unsold inventory of STEC product into 2010. Subsequently, the price of STEC stock dropped
38.9 percent from nearly $23 per share to just above $14. Id. at 4.
Moshayedi disputed the Commission’s claims and stated that there was nothing
inappropriate about the alleged “secret deal.” Moshayedi claimed that the deal was not
entered into for the purpose of fabricating guidance numbers. Rather, he asserted that the deal
provided STEC with knowledge regarding EMC’s purchasing ability. During closing
arguments, Moshayedi’s lawyer argued that Moshayedi did not enter into the “side
agreement” to profit from the secondary offering, but instead to “avoid the chaos of [the
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Pursuant to Section 17(a)(3), the SEC may pursue negligent insider
trading causes of action, but only against a person — in breach of a duty
owed — that negligently sells (or offers to sell) securities, or tips a third party
when such person possesses material and nonpublic information.125 As such,
the elements of a negligent insider trading cause of action, enforceable under
the current version of Section 17(a)(3), are: (1) selling (or offering to sell) a
security (2) in breach of a fiduciary duty or other relationship of trust and
confidence (3) that occurs as a result of (4) a negligent (5) failure to
adequately disclose (6) material and nonpublic information (7) that (either
directly or indirectly) results in a “fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.” 126
A. “Possession” v. “Awareness” in the Context of Negligent Insider
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customer] ordering late in the quarter.” Edvard Pettersson & Maurice Possley, SEC Loses
Latest Insider-Trading Trial to Former STEC CEO, BLOOMBERG (Jun. 7, 2014, 12:01 AM),
http://bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-06/sec-loses-latest-insider-trading-trial-to-former-stecceo.html [https://perma.cc/8E2S-S8DS].
Ultimately, a jury rejected the SEC’s claims and found Moshayedi not liable for
insider trading. The jury’s decision rested on a contradiction between EMC’s notice to STEC
that it would not enter into another contract and the fact that, at the time, Moshayedi was
engaged in negotiations with EMC, which went on for a considerable period, over a separate
and unrelated contract. While EMC’s notice to STEC regarding the purchase of flash drives
does state it would not enter into another agreement, the jury concluded that the notice was
simply a negotiating tactic used in the context of ongoing negotiations.
Although the SEC failed to successfully prosecute Moshayedi under a theory of
scienter, an argument can be made that Moshayedi negligently traded based on material and
nonpublic information. The argument is as follows: Moshayedi, as CEO of STEC, Inc., owed
a duty to STEC, Inc. to avoid self-dealing. Although a jury held that Moshayedi did not
intentionally breach the duty to STEC to avoid self-dealing, Moshayedi’s sale of STEC stock
in the secondary offering may be viewed as self-dealing because he allegedly took advantage
of, and profited from, a fabricated increase in the price of STEC stock, regardless of whether
or not it was intentional. Further, the purchasers of Moshayedi’s stock were prejudiced based
on Moshayedi’s failure to disclose the material and nonpublic information that he possessed.
This failure to disclose resulted in the purchasers losing money once the price of the stock
declined. Thus, without the disclosure of material and nonpublic information in the
impersonal trading markets, constructive fraud was committed “upon the purchaser.”
Therefore, Moshayedi’s alleged actions remain susceptible to enforcement under both the
current and the yet-to-be-amended version of Section 17(a)(3). Regardless of the fact that he
did not intentionally trade the STEC stock based on material and nonpublic information, the
allegations suggest that, under the authority of the current version of Section 17(a)(3),
Moshayedi’s actions “in the offer or sale of . . . securities . . . indirectly . . . operate[d] as a
fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.” 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3). This liability is unchanged under
the authority of the yet-to-be-amended version of Section 17(a)(3), which would still invoke
liability since Moshayedi’s alleged actions “in the purchase or sale of . . . securities . . .
indirectly . . . operate[d] as a fraud or deceit upon any person.”
125. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3).
126. Id.
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Trading
Contrasted with Section 10(b), which has an “awareness”
requirement,127 “possession” of material and nonpublic information is the
proper standard for a cause of action for negligent insider trading under
Section 17(a)(3).128 With respect to Section 10(b), in order to be held liable
for insider trading, a defendant must do more than merely “possess” material
and nonpublic information.129 Rather, pursuant to Rule 10b5-1, the scienter
requirement of Section 10(b) is deemed to be fulfilled with proof that the
defendant purchased or sold securities while “aware” of material nonpublic
information at the time of the purchase or sale.130 Thus, Rule 10b5-1 posits
that one who is aware of material and nonpublic information at the time of
the purchase or sale will inevitably make use of such information.131
It follows that a cause of action for negligent insider trading cannot
logically support the requisite level of culpability for intentional insider
trading under Section 10(b), because, by definition, the “awareness” standard
maintains the implication of willful intent. Thus, in order to pursue a cause
of action for negligent insider trading, the “awareness” element of intentional
insider trading must be abandoned in order to conform to a lesser culpability
standard upon which negligent causes of action are based. This is satisfied
with the “possession” standard – namely, when a defendant improperly
trades or tips while possessing information that the defendant knows, or
should know, is material and nonpublic.
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127. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1; see also discussion supra note 10 and accompanying text.
128. Sturc & Cummer, supra note 83.
129. See US v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1067 (9th Cir. 1998) (adopting the “use” rather than
“possession” standard); see also Adler, 137 F.3d at 1337 (holding that Section 10(b)’s scienter
requirement mandates proof that, when the defendant traded the subject securities, they
actually used the material and nonpublic information, rather than merely possess it). In the
past, the SEC has opined that mere “possession,” rather than “use,” of the material nonpublic
information is sufficient to trigger liability under Section 10(b). See Report of the
Investigation in the Matter of Sterling Drug, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14675
(Apr. 18, 1978) (asserting that “[i]f an insider sells his securities while in possession of
material adverse non-public information, such an insider is taking advantage of his position
to the detriment of the public”). The Second Circuit has also endorsed the “possession”
standard by stating that “material information can not [sic] lay idle in the human brain.”
United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 1993). But see Gansman, 657 F.3d at 92
(stating “In prosecuting a putative ‘tipper’ under the misappropriation theory of insider
trading, the government must prove as an element of the offense that the tipper conveyed
material nonpublic information to his ‘tippee’ with the understanding that it would be used
for securities trading purposes.”) (emphasis added).
130. Final Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 34-43154 (2000).
131. Supra note 122.
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B. The Misappropriation Theory and the Language of Section
17(a)(3)
If construed in a remedial manner, application of the misappropriation
theory in the Section 17(a)(3) context effectuates a broad reach of insider
trading liability based on negligence.
As discussed above, the
misappropriation theory premises liability on deception of the source of the
information, rather than on deception of shareholders — as with the classical
“special relationship” theory.132 By contrast, a more expansive application
of the misappropriation theory within the context of Section 17(a)(3) may be
invoked by focusing on the statute’s use of the word “indirectly.”
Section 17(a)(3) addresses the proscription against deficient disclosure
in the “offer or sale” setting. When Section 17(a)(3) is viewed in its entirety,
with the inclusion of the statute’s introductory paragraph, the word
“indirectly” alters the scope of the provision by broadening the range of
potential defendants that come within its reach — regardless of the proposed
amendment.
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any
securities . . . by the use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by use
of the mails, directly or indirectly— . . .(3) to engage in any
transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.133
The inclusion of the word “indirectly” encompasses any transaction,
practice, or course of business committed by a person that indirectly operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon a purchaser.134 In the context of
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132. See supra notes 47-59 and accompanying text.
133. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a).
134. See SEC v. Syron, 934 F. Supp. 2d 609, 639-40 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2013) (holding
that the SEC failed to allege that defendants personally gained money or property from the
employer’s stock offering, but acknowledging that liability may exist when the money is
obtained “indirectly” or in a “highly roundabout manner”) (emphasis added); see also SEC v.
Mudd, 885 F. Supp. 2d 654, 668-71 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2012) (showing SEC sufficiently
pleading that Federal National Mortgage Association’s (FNMA) Chief Executive Officer
(CEO) and Chief Risk Officer (CRO) directly or indirectly obtained money or property by
means of false statements regarding percentage of loans that fell into FNMA’s subprime and
low-documentation loan descriptions because each received a bonus that was tied to both
FNMA’s performance and their own personal performance in attaining individual year-end
goals and that their false statements in the offer and sale of FNMA securities were sufficient
to state a claim under the antifraud section of the Securities Act); SEC v. Stoker, 865 F. Supp.
2d 457, 463-64 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 6, 2012) (demonstrating the SEC sufficiently pleading that
broker-dealer’s director, acting as its agent, facilitated a fraud in violation of antifraud section
of the Securities Act; the Act clearly provided that violation could occur if defendant obtained
funds either “directly or indirectly” and SEC alleged that director had obtained millions of
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insider trading, one theory by which a defendant can be held liable as a result
of an “indirect” violation of insider trading laws is the misappropriation
theory.135
Although the securities laws do not define the term “indirectly,”
congressional history suggests that insider trading provisions — especially
those regarding the misappropriation theory — are intended to have a
flexible scope,136 thus, lending credibility to the proposed amendment as well
as the theory of negligent insider trading. An example of the intended scope
of insider trading provisions comes from the legislative history of the Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988.137 This Act, among
other things: (1) expanded the scope of civil penalties to control persons who
fail to take adequate steps to prevent insider trading;138 (2) granted the SEC
authority to award payments to persons who provide information regarding
insider trading violations; and, most notably for purposes of this article, (3)
established a private right of action for buyers and sellers of securities against
culpable inside traders if they traded “contemporaneously” with such inside
traders.139 Accordingly, under this rationale, misappropriation of material
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dollars for his employer while acting as its agent, or, alternatively, that director had personally
obtained money indirectly from structuring and marketing fraudulent collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs)).
135. See supra notes 47-59 and accompanying text.
136. See H.R. REP. No. 100-910, at 27-28 (1988) (“Despite the absence of explicit
statutory language for private rights of action outside of the contemporaneous trader plaintiff
situation, the Committee recognized that there clearly are injuries caused by insider trading
to others beyond contemporaneous traders. In the view of the Committee, Section 10(b), Rule
10b-5, and other relevant provisions of the Exchange Act have sufficient flexibility to
recognize and protect any person defrauded or harmed by a violation of any provision of this
title or the rules or regulations thereunder by another person’s purchasing or selling a security
while in the possession of material, nonpublic information, or communicating such
information to others.”).
137. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §78t-1, §78u-1).
138. 15 U.S.C. §78u-1(a)(3) imposed on a person controlling the violator a penalty of the
greater of $1,000,000 or three times the profit gained or loss avoided. For further discussion,
see STEINBERG & WANG, supra note 3, at § 6.3.
139. 15 U.S.C. §78t-1 (a). This legislation overturned the Second Circuit’s decision in
Moss v. Morgan Stanley holding that contemporaneous traders did not have a private right of
action under Section 10(b). 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983). The court reasoned that the culpable
misappropriator did not breach a duty owed to such traders. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, supra
note 135, at 26-27. The term “contemporaneous” has caused a fair amount of controversy.
See, e.g., In re Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n Secs., Derivative, & “ERISA” Litig., 503 F. Supp. 2d
25, 47 (D.D.C. Jul. 31, 2007) (citing cases in which the respective court required the plaintiffs’
trades to occur within the same day as the insider trading transaction); but see In re Cell
Therapeutics, Inc. Class Action Litig., No. 2:10-cv-00414-MJP, 2011 WL 444676, at *9
(W.D. Wash. Feb. 4, 2011) (stating that the Ninth Circuit has not defined “contemporaneous,”
however “two business days is sufficiently close in time to satisfy the term.”).
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nonpublic information in breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the source of
the information indirectly operates as a deceit or fraud upon
contemporaneous traders, including purchasers who sell their securities
“contemporaneously” with an inside tipper or his tippee.140 Hence, an inside
trader or his tippee in the “bad news” misappropriation context141
“victimizes” contemporaneous purchasers within the meaning of Section
17(a)(3).142
C. The Effect of the Proposed Amendment
In Aaron, the Supreme Court held that, in order to prove a violation of
Section 17(a)(3), the SEC is only required to prove that the defendant was
negligent.143 Invoking Section 17(a)(3), the focus is on the fraudulent effect
of the defendant’s conduct on purchasers of the subject securities.144
Nonetheless, under the current version of Section 17(a)(3), there remains a
class of defendants that escape liability for negligent insider trading — those
persons who, acting with negligence, purchase the subject securities or
engage in tipping in regard thereto.

The most prominent example of the non-contemporaneous trader suit which came
to the attention of the Committee involved a suit filed by Anheuser-Busch
Companies, Inc. against Paul Thayer, a former director of the corporation. . . . In
that case, the plaintiff alleged that it was defrauded not as a result of trading with
the defendant, but by having information secretly stolen and by having the
subsequent trading on the information concealed. According to the complaint in
this case, prior to public dissemination, the tipper disclosed to several parties the
plans of Anheuser-Busch to acquire Campbell Taggart, Inc. The alleged
misappropriation of Anheuser-Busch’s confidential information proximately
caused a significant increase in the market price of Campbell Taggart stock before
Anheuser-Busch announced its offer. This forced Anheuser-Busch to raise its
tender offer price, and the company eventually paid approximately $80 million
more as a result of the illegal insider trading. Clearly, in such a case, the plaintiff
corporation was a victim of the defendant’s misappropriation . . . .
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Id. at 28.
143. 446 U.S. at 701-02.
144. Aaron, 446 U.S at 697. See generally In re Bolan, 2015 SEC LEXIS 2201.
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140. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, supra note 135, at 25-28; 134 CONG. REV. S17, 219
(daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Sen. Heinz) (stating that “this legislation provides those
who have been harmed by insider trading [namely, contemporaneous traders] with an express
private right of action . . .”).
141. See 134 CONG. REC. S17, 220 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Sen. Garn)
(stating that private investors should have a right to recover when they have been victimized
by insider trading violations based on the misappropriation theory).
142. See supra notes 135-36. Notably, the House Report “recognized that there clearly
are injuries caused by insider trading to others beyond contemporaneous traders.” H.R. REP.
NO. 100-910, supra note 135, at 27. The Report thereafter provided the following example:
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Under the statute’s current scope, liability attaches solely to the
defendant that engages in misconduct via an “offer or sale.”145 By replacing
the phrase “offer or sale” in the text preceding all three clauses of Section
17(a) with “purchase or sale” (as in Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5), Section
17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) will, in effect, be applicable to negligent misconduct,
regardless of whether such misconduct was perpetrated by means of a
purchase or a sale. Also, in Section 17(a)(3), by replacing the words “the
purchaser” with “any person” (as in Rule 10b-5(c)), that provision would
extend to situations in which any actor, regardless of whether such person
was a purchaser or seller, engaged in misconduct by means of either a
purchase or sale, thus broadening Section 17(a)(3)’s current scope of
liability. This amended version of Section 17(a)(3) would broaden the
statute’s scope of liability, with minimal alterations to its overall language.
D. Insider Trading Cases Based on Negligence That the SEC May
Have Successfully Pursued Under the Proposed Amendment of
Section 17(a)(3)
1. SEC v. Switzer
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145. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a).
146. Switzer, 590 F.Supp. at 762. Coach Switzer also was the coach of the last Dallas
Cowboys team to win the Super Bowl – in 1996.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 766. In order to be held liable for negligent insider trading under the current
version of Section 17(a)(3), the insider trades and tips must have been based on material and
nonpublic information that operated as a “fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.” 15 U.S.C.
§78u-1(a)(3). In this scenario, Platt, the insider, provided the inadvertent tip that resulted in
Coach Switzer’s purchase and subsequent profit. Switzer, 590 F.Supp. at 766. Therefore,
neither Platt nor Coach Switzer can be susceptible to liability under the current version of
Section 17(a)(3) because the facts of this scenario did not result in a “fraud upon the
purchaser.”

39057-ple_19-2 reissue Sheet No. 21 Side B

In SEC v. Switzer, the SEC brought an insider trading suit against the
University of Oklahoma football coach Barry Switzer alleging that Coach
Switzer was liable under Rule 10b-5.146 The alleged insider trades that Coach
Switzer transacted were a result of information that he overheard from an
acquaintance who was an insider of the company whose stock Switzer
purchased.147 However, the court held that neither Coach Switzer nor the
insider-tipper were liable for insider trading because the tipper had not
willfully breached a fiduciary duty for a personal benefit.148
The facts of SEC v. Switzer are as follows: Texas International
Company (TIC) was a publicly-held company that explored and developed
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oil and natural gas properties.149 Four days prior to the public announcement
of a merger between TIC and Phoenix Resources Company (Phoenix), a
majority-owned subsidiary which was also a publicly-traded company,
Coach Switzer attended a track meet at the University of Oklahoma.150 Also
attending the track meet was George Platt — the Chairman of the Board and
the Chief Executive Officer of TIC who also served on the board of directors
of Phoenix.151 During the track meet, Switzer overheard Platt talking to
Platt’s wife about the forthcoming merger.152 In response to the information
that he overheard, Switzer informed several other associates who collectively
purchased shares of Phoenix stock and profited from the purchase.153
Thereafter, the SEC brought suit against Coach Switzer and Platt for insider
trading violations under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.154 Specifically, the
SEC alleged that Platt improperly tipped Coach Switzer (in breach of Platt’s
fiduciary duty to Phoenix as an undisputed insider) and that Coach Switzer
improperly purchased Phoenix stock.155 Applying the Supreme Court’s
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149. Id. at 759.
150. Id. at 761.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 762.
153. Id. at 763.
154. Id. at 764.
155. Id. at 766. In regard to Platt as tipper, Platt was an insider of both TIC and Phoenix,
and, accordingly, had an affirmative duty to disclose or abstain. Id. However, the court held
that, despite the fact that Coach Switzer profited from material nonpublic information that he
received from Platt, Platt did not violate Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because Platt did not
intentionally provide the information to Coach Switzer, nor did he personally benefit from the
disclosure. Id. In finding that Platt had not violated Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the court
referenced the Supreme Court’s holding in Dirks by stating that “only when a disclosure is
made for an ‘improper purpose’ will such a ‘tip’ constitute a breach of an insider’s duty. . . .”
Id. Further, the court stated “[i]n Dirks, the court held that a disclosure is made for an
‘improper purpose’ when an insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his
disclosure.” Id. (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662). Thus, since Platt did not intentionally
disclose the material and nonpublic information to Coach Switzer regarding the merger
between TIC and Phoenix and because he did not personally benefit from the disclosure, the
court held that Platt was not liable for insider trading under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Id.
In regard to Coach Switzer as a tippee, he was obviously not an insider of either TIC
or Phoenix because he was not employed by either company, nor did he maintain any position
of trust or confidence. Id. at 765. In finding that Coach Switzer had not breached any
derivative fiduciary duty owed to Phoenix’s shareholders derived from Platt’s fiduciary duty
owed to Phoenix’s shareholders, and thus did not violate Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the
court again referenced the Supreme Court’s holding in Dirks by stating, “only when there has
been a breach of an insider’s duty which the ‘tippee’ knew or should have known constituted
such a breach will there be ‘tippee’ liability sufficient to constitute a violation of § 10(b) and
Commission Rule 10b-5.” Id. at 766.
Further, the court stated that “‘absent a breach by the insider [to his stockholders],
there is no derivative breach [by the tippee].’” Id. (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662). Thus,
since Platt (as the insider) did not intentionally breach a duty to the TIC and Phoenix
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Dirks test, the court held that neither Coach Switzer nor Platt were liable for
insider trading.156
Although the Switzer court may have properly applied the Dirks
standard by finding that neither party intentionally violated Section 10(b),
the facts of this case, on their face, may suggest that the conduct of the parties
merited the levying of sanctions under a theory of negligence. Irrespective
of the fact that there was a finding of no intentional wrongdoing, one party
(Coach Switzer) was granted an unfair advantage to profit from material
inside information that he received from a corporate insider when that insider
acted negligently by communicating this sensitive information at a public
track meet.157
By amending Section 17(a)(3), the SEC would have authority to pursue
negligent insider trading causes of action against a defendant such as Platt.
A negligent insider trading cause of action under the proposed version of
Section 17(a)(3) would have provided the SEC with the wherewithal to
prosecute the prohibited act of insider trading against subject persons
involved in that scenario who either “directly or indirectly” engaged in any
practice that operated “as a fraud or deceit upon any person.” Based on the
circumstances of this situation, Platt negligently failed to take reasonable
precautions to protect information that he “knew or reasonably should have
known was material,” and as a direct result of Platt’s failure to take such
precautions, Coach Switzer financially benefitted from confidential
information that he knew came from a reliable inside source.
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stockholders, Coach Switzer (as tippee) could not have committed a derivative breach. Id. at
767.
156. Id. at 767.
157. In contrast to prior lower court case law (see, e.g., Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc.,
635 F.2d 156, 165 (2d Cir. 1980)), the Supreme Court’s holding in Dirks also established that
a “loose-lipped” corporate insider such as Platt will not be held liable for insider trading if the
insider discloses material nonpublic information regarding the company to whose
stockholders the corporate insider owes a fiduciary duty if the insider did not intend for the
disclosure of information to be a gift or to result in a personal benefit to the insider. 463 U.S.
at 662 (1983). However, despite this limitation of liability, it is only reasonable to suggest
that a corporate insider (such as Platt) who talks loudly in a public place (such as a track meet)
about information that is material and nonpublic regarding a sensitive and confidential
corporate matter should be held liable, especially when such information is overheard and is
the basis for the ensuing trades.
Note, moreover, that SEC Regulation FD, which is not part of the insider trading
statutory regimen, generally prohibits selective disclosure. See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. §
243.100 (prohibiting selective disclosure) et seq.; Securities Exchange Release No. 43,154
(2000) (commenting on the prohibition of selective disclosure); Marc I. Steinberg and Jason
B. Myers, Lurking in the Shadows: The Hidden Issues of the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s Regulation FD, 27 J. CORP L. 173 (2002) (discussing the prohibition of
selective disclosure).
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2. U.S. v. Conradt
In U.S. v. Conradt, the government brought a criminal prosecution for
insider trading against five defendants (four traders at Euro-Pacific and one
of the trader’s roommates, an equities analyst) for allegedly trading based on
material and nonpublic information regarding IBM Corp.’s $1.2 billion
acquisition of software company SPSS Inc.158 The indictment alleged that
the information originated from an associate at an outside law firm, Michael
Dallas.159 Dallas had been working on the IBM deal and disseminated the
inside information to Trent Martin, an equities analyst.160 After receiving the
tip, Martin allegedly passed it along to his roommate, the defendant Thomas
Conradt, who was one of the Euro-Pacific traders.161 Conradt subsequently
tipped three other traders, all of whom allegedly traded on the information.162
As a result, the government relied on the misappropriation theory in its cause
of action despite the fact that the government’s indictment contained no
obvious allegations that the law firm associate who provided the inside
information received any “objective, consequential” personal benefit
representing the potential of a pecuniary gain in exchange for that
disclosure.163
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158. U.S. v. Conradt, No. 12-CR-887, 2015 WL 480419 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 28, 2012).
159. Indictment at 3, U.S. v. Conradt, No. 12-CR-887, 2015 WL 480419 (S.D.N.Y., Nov.
28, 2012).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. The further facts of United States. v. Conradt are: four of the five defendants
entered guilty pleas. No. 12-CR-887, 2015 WL 480419 at *1. The day after the Second
Circuit’s ruling in Newman, (773 F.3d 438), the court scheduled a status conference to
determine whether the Second Circuit’s ruling affected the guilty pleas of the four former
traders and Martin who admitted to an insider trading scheme. Id. The court advised all of
the parties that, in light of the Newman decision, the Court was inclined to vacate those guilty
pleas as legally insufficient as a result of the Second Circuit’s “clarification of the personal
benefit and tippee knowledge requirements of tipping liability for insider trading.” Id. at *1*2. Although the government recognized that Newman had stated that the tests for insider
trading were the same under the classical and misappropriation theories, the government
opposed undoing the defendants’ guilty pleas, arguing that any reference to the
misappropriation theory in Newman was dicta and that prior Second Circuit decisions have
held that the misappropriation theory does not require the tipper to receive any personal
benefit to be liable for insider trading. Id. After hearing from the parties during the hearing,
Judge Carter indicated that he had serious doubts about whether there was a sufficient factual
basis for the guilty pleas but agreed to the Government’s request to prepare briefing on the
issue seeking to distinguish Conradt from Newman on the basis that the initial tipper in
Conradt was not a corporate insider. Id. at *1.
On January 12, 2015, the government filed a brief supporting the sufficiency of the
defendants’ guilty pleas, arguing that the Second Circuit’s holding in Newman was limited to
cases brought under the so-called “classical” theory of insider-trading liability — cases in
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which the tipper is a corporate insider, who owes fiduciary duties to the corporation and its
shareholders. See Government’s Memorandum of Law in Support of the Sufficiency of the
Defendants’ Guilty Pleas, Conradt, No. 12-CR-887 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2015), ECF No. 153.
Because the case at bar was brought under the “misappropriation” theory of insider trading,
in which the tipper is a corporate outsider who misappropriates confidential information in
breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the source of the information, the Government contended
that Newman should not apply. Id. at 1.
On January 22, 2015, the Court rejected the government’s invitation to limit the
Second Circuit’s decision in Newman to classical insider-trading cases. Conradt, 2015 WL
480419, at *2. In doing so, the Court first noted that both Newman and an earlier Second
Circuit decision, Obus, 693 F.3d 276, make clear that “the elements of tipping liability are the
same, regardless of whether the tipper’s duty arises under the ‘classical’ or the
‘misappropriation’ theory.” Id. at *2 (quoting Newman, 773 F.3d at 446). The Court also
noted that “even if Newman did not specifically resolve the issue” the “emphatic dicta” in
Newman addressing the issue was part of a “meticulous and conscientious effort by the Second
Circuit to clarify the state of insider-trading law” and should be given effect. Id. Further, the
Court indicated that it disagreed with the government’s position on the merits, as well as the
government’s reliance on earlier Second Circuit case law — particularly U.S. v. Libera, 989
F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1993) — finding that such case law is consistent with Newman’s holding
and that “the relevant language from [Libera] . . . has itself been construed to be mere
implication in dicta.” Conradt, 2015 WL 480419, at *3 n.1. As a result, the Court vacated
the four defendants’ guilty pleas and noted that it will later address two other motions to
dismiss on the basis of Newman. Id.
Shortly after that ruling, on January 28, 2015, the assistant U.S. Attorney wrote to
the Court and requested permission to drop the charges against all five defendants, conceding
that the recent Second Circuit opinion “substantially changed the law pertaining to insider
trading.” See Exhibit 5, Reply Affidavit of Samuel J. Lieberman in Support of Respondent
Gregory T. Bolan, Jr.’s Motion for Summary Disposition, In the Matter of Gregory T. Bolan,
Jr. and Joseph C. Ruggieri (SEC received Feb. 9, 2015). At a hearing the following day, the
assistant U.S. Attorney told the Court that, in light of the Newman Court’s “new, heightened
standard” the government no longer had “the requisite evidence to establish one of the
elements of the crime” (referring to the newly clarified personal benefit requirement). He
further stated that, if the Second Circuit’s decision should be reversed in the future, the
government would consider charging all five defendants again (assuming that the statute of
limitations has not run). As a result, the Court granted the government’s request to dismiss
the causes of action against all five defendants without prejudice. See Ed Beeson, Judge to
Dismiss IBM Insider Trading Case at Feds Request, Law 360 (Jan. 29, 2015). Significantly,
the U.S. Supreme Court in Salman, 137 S.Ct. 420 (2016), subsequently rejected the Second
Circuit’s rationale in Newman, thereby leaving open the possibility that these charges may be
reinstituted by the government.
Notably, prior to the criminal prosecution, the SEC instituted an enforcement action
based on the misappropriation theory against these individuals. SEC v. Conradt, 947
F.Supp.2d 406 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 4, 2013). Handing down its ruling prior to the Second Circuit’s
decision in Newman, the district court denied the motions to dismiss. Id. Subsequently, a
number of the defendants entered into settlements with the SEC and then sought to have these
settlements vacated after Newman was decided. SEC v. Conradt, 309 F.R.D. 186 (S.D.N.Y.
Jul. 23, 2015). The district court denied the motions. See id. (holding investors did not show
the exceptional circumstances needed to support relief from consent judgments).
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insider trading liability against any of the parties involved in this scenario
that “negligently” engaged in “a fraud or deceit.”164 As alleged, Dallas, an
attorney whose law firm was retained to help effectuate IBM’s contemplated
acquisition of SPSS Inc., carelessly disclosed material and nonpublic
information that he “knew or reasonably should have known was material,”
in breach of the duty of trust and confidentiality he owed to the source of the
information — IBM.165 The information that Dallas carelessly disclosed
carried with it “a substantial likelihood that a reasonable purchaser or seller
of a security (1) would consider the fact important in deciding whether to
buy or sell the security or (2) would have viewed the total mix of information
made available to be significantly altered by disclosure of the fact.”166 As a
result, Conradt, Weishaus, and the traders gained possession of this material
and nonpublic information, and subsequently tipped and/or traded based on
this information. Therefore, Conradt’s tip, and the subsequent trades by his
tippees, resulted from material and nonpublic information that they gained
(directly or indirectly) from Dallas, who breached a duty of confidentiality
to IBM by divulging this confidential information. Such misconduct would
have subjected these individuals to SEC enforcement action under the
proposed amended Section 17(a)(3).167
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164. Important to the context of these circumstances is the relationship between Dallas
and Martin. Based on the SEC’s original complaint, Dallas and Martin “frequently shared
both personal and professional confidences.” Complaint at 6, SEC v. Conradt, 947 F.Supp.2d
406 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 29, 2012). However, “each knew or reasonably should have known
that the other expected such information to be maintained in confidence.” Id. Thus, similar
to the application of the proposed amended Section 17(a)(3) to the facts of Switzer, the facts
of U.S. v. Conradt should invoke liability for a negligent breach of duty of trust and
confidentiality that Dallas owed to IBM. A negligent insider trading cause of action under
the yet-to-be-amended Section 17(a)(3) would have provided the SEC with the authority to
enforce the prohibited act of insider trading against the law firm associate. Based on the
circumstances of this situation, Dallas negligently failed to take reasonable precautions to
protect information that he “knew or reasonably should have known was material.” See Bank
of America, supra note 118 (providing a discussion of the case). As a direct result of Dallas’s
failure to take such precautions, Conradt, Weishaus, and others engaged in transactions that
operated as a “fraud or deceit.” 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3).
165. Indictment at 3, U.S. v. Conradt, No. 12-CR-887, 2015 WL 480419 (S.D.N.Y., Nov.
28, 2012).
166. Longman, 197 F.3d at 683 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667 n. 27
(concluding that “to constitute a violation of Rule 10b–5, there must be fraud”).
167. In order to be held liable for negligent insider trading under the current version of
Section 17(a)(3), the insider trades and tips must have been based on material and nonpublic
information that resulted in a “fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.” 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3). In
this scenario, Dallas and Conradt provided the inadvertent tips that resulted in the traders’
purchases and subsequent profits. Therefore, Dallas, Conradt, Weishaus, and the traders
cannot be susceptible to liability under the current version of Section 17(a)(3) because this
conduct allegedly perpetrated fraud upon sellers.
For Dallas, Conradt, Weishaus, and the traders to be held liable under the yet-to-be-
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3. In the Matter of Gregory T. Bolan, Jr.
In the Bolan proceeding, the SEC settled administrative cease-anddesist proceedings under various statutes, including Section 17(a)(3), against
a research analyst at Wells Fargo.168 The SEC alleged that the defendant
communicated notice of a stock’s rating downgrade to a trader (Ruggieri —
a Wells Fargo senior trader), who proceeded to trade on the information
before it was made public.169 Because Bolan did not act with scienter, he did
not violate Section 10(b).170 He nonetheless allegedly violated Section
17(a)(3) by breaching his duty to his employer when he “should have known
that he was providing notice to Ruggieri . . . of material nonpublic
information . . . .”171 The SEC ultimately settled with Bolan based on
negligent insider trading under Section 17(a)(3).172 However, due to the
provision’s limiting language, the settlement only regarded the insider tips
that resulted in sales.173
Under the proposed version of Section 17(a)(3), the SEC would have
had the authority to institute an enforcement action alleging negligent insider
trading against Bolan that involved the subject purchases as well as sales.
Based on the language of the yet-to-be-amended Section 17(a)(3), elements
of a negligent insider trading cause of action are: (1) buying or selling (or the
offer of) a security (2) in breach of a fiduciary duty or other relationship of
trust and confidence (3) that occurs as a result of (4) a negligent (5) failure
to adequately disclose (6) material and nonpublic information (7) that the
defendant knew or should have known was material (8) that (either directly
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amended Section 17(a)(3), the insider trades and tips must have been based on material and
nonpublic information that resulted in a “fraud or deceit upon any person.” By amending
Section 17(a)(3), the SEC would be granted authority to pursue negligent insider trading
causes of action against defendants, such as the ones in this case, who cannot be successfully
prosecuted for insider trading under the current statute. A negligent insider trading cause of
action under the proposed version of Section 17(a)(3) would have provided the SEC with the
authority to enforce the prohibited act of insider trading against any of the parties involved in
this scenario who either “directly or indirectly” engaged in any transaction or practice that
operated “as a fraud or deceit upon any person.”
168. In re Bolan, 2015 SEC LEXIS 2201.
169. Id. at *4 (The PRXL rating was downgraded by Bolan as a direct result of Bolan’s
research).
170. Id.
171. Id. at *8.
172. Id.
173. In order to be held liable for negligent insider trading under the current version of
Section 17(a)(3), the insider trades and tips must have been based on material and nonpublic
information that resulted in a “fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.” 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3). In
this scenario, Bolan’s tips resulted in Ruggieri’s trades that were both purchases and sales.
Therefore, both Bolan and Ruggieri were susceptible to liability under the current version of
Section 17(a)(3) for Ruggieri’s sales.
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or indirectly) results in a “fraud or deceit upon any person.”
As alleged, Bolan, an analyst at Wells Fargo who was entrusted to keep
research confidential until publicly disseminated, carelessly disclosed
material and nonpublic information that he “reasonably should have known
was material,” in breach of the duty of trust and confidentiality that he owed
to Wells Fargo as an employee of the company. As a result, Bolan’s tippee
became privy to material and nonpublic information and subsequently traded
while in possession of this information. Therefore, Bolan’s tips and
Ruggieri’s trades were a direct result of the material and nonpublic
information that they gained. Accordingly, both Bolan and his tippee would
be subject to SEC enforcement action under the yet-to-be-amended Section
17(a)(3).
CONCLUSION
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Liability for negligent insider trading under Section 17(a)(3) should be
an important objective in the federal regulation of insider trading.
Throughout the history of insider trading litigation, liability has frequently
hinged upon the crucial element of scienter. Due to this required element,
negligent actors engaging in purchases (or tipping in regard thereto) have
avoided liability despite the fact that, as a result of their negligence, they
gained an unfair advantage to reap profits to the detriment of investors who
sold securities without being privy to such information. With respect to
insider purchases and tips, two classifications of insider trading liability are
currently recognized: (1) a defendant did not commit insider trading; and (2)
a defendant committed insider trading by acting with scienter. These
classifications are on opposite sides of the spectrum. The proposed
amendment to Section 17(a)(3) bridges this gap by providing the SEC with
the authority to pursue negligent misconduct in both the purchase and sale
contexts.
If the SEC had the ability to pursue claims of negligent insider trading
under Section 17(a)(3), it only stands to reason that the SEC would gain an
upper hand in its current “war” on insider trading. The SEC would be able
to pursue a higher number of insider trading cases with the less rigorous
burden of proving negligence. A likely effect of this newly-granted authority
would be the enhancement of market integrity through elimination of the
senseless mental culpability distinctions that currently reside in the void of
insider trading liability.
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